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This thesis explores (in)security discourse of the LGBTQ community in Poland and their 
resistance to (in)securitisation. It engages with the narratives and experiences politically 
relevant in today’s Poland, where the government not only refuses to acknowledge 
insecurities faced by the LGBTQ individuals, but itself tries to present homosexuality as a 
threat.  Problematisation of invisible subjects of security who paradoxically are created by the 
very process of securitisation is the primary focus of this study. Considering that concepts of 
security and resistance are differently practised outside the heteronormative frameworks, the 
study queers both concepts to capture security problems experienced by LGBTQ individuals 
and focuses on emancipatory and empowering potential of resistance. By doing so, it 
attempts to address the ways how marginalised groups can have more voice and agency to be 
included in inclusive queer informed security agenda. The study applies a theoretical 
framework informed by PARIS School of security studies rooted in broader International 
Political Sociological (IPS) and poststructuralist feminist critique of securitisation theory and 
seeks to provide a reformulated queered approach to (in)securitisation. By interviewing 
fifteen LGBTQ individuals and activists from Kraków, the study directly engages with the 
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The presented study explores (in)security discourse of the LGBTQ1 community in 
Poland and their resistance to (in)securitisation. It engages with the narratives and experiences 
politically relevant in today’s Poland, where the government not only refuses to acknowledge 
insecurities faced by the LGBTQ individuals, but itself tries to present homosexuality as a 
threat. By declaring the LGBTQ community as a threat to the Polish state, nation and identity, 
the Polish ruling Law and Justice Party controls the line between security and insecurity. As a 
result, the LGBTQ individuals’ security is not only ignored but is also threatened.  
The rising exclusionary far-right politics in Europe (Rooduijn et al. 2019) makes 
minorities face significant constraints to their freedom of expression and endangers them 
(Lazaridis et al. 2016). These trends also serve as a reminder that progress is not always linear, 
and that regression in human rights protection is possible. Considering that, it is particularly 
important to understand how marginal and vulnerable people can be affected by actors who 
claim authority over deciding whose security matters. It is even more critical to understand 
tools of an agency that marginal groups employ to make their voices heard and by that, to 
empower them to have a say in shaping an inclusive security agenda. 
Problematisation of invisible subjects of security who paradoxically are created by the 
very process of securitisation is the primary focus of this thesis. The study departs from two 
starting points, acknowledging that the concepts of security and resistance are practised 
differently outside the heteronormative frameworks (see Jakobsen 1998; Weber 2014; McEvoy 
2015; Baker 2017; Tyburczy 2017; Daniel and Berwick 2020) and formulates two main 
research questions: 1) Why queering security is important with the rise of exclusionary far-
right politics? 2) Why focus on resistance as an expression of agency can benefit queered 
approach to security? Together with analytical discussion of the consequences of the exclusion 
of security of LGBTQ community from dominant security paradigm, the study aims to explore 
Polish LGBTQ community’s (in)security discourse and their resistance to government’s and 
other securitising actors’ homophobic pressures. Thus, by focusing on the emancipatory and 
empowering potential of resistance, address the ways how marginalised groups can have more 
voice and agency to be included in inclusive queer informed security agenda. The paper takes 
the case of LGBTQ community in Kraków, Poland and applies a theoretical framework 
informed by PARIS School rooted in broader International Political Sociological (IPS) and 
 
1 The initialism standing for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer individuals 
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poststructuralist feminist critique of securitisation theory to provide a reformulated queered 
approach to (in)securitisation. By interviewing fifteen LGBTQ individuals and activists from 
Kraków, the study directly engages with the subjects of the study and puts their perceptions 
and experiences at the centre of the inquiry. Therefore, the key idea behind this thesis is first, 
an examination of the perlocutionary effect of (in)securitising practises on the security of 
LGBTQ community and second, to move beyond discursive practises and examine various 
non-discursive ways of security articulation and contestation. Thus, to contribute to a better 
understanding of dynamics surrounding securitisation of minorities and to address possibilities 
of marginal voices’ inclusion in security agenda. 
Regarding the social relevance of this study, Poland presents a compelling example 
of the government legitimising LGBTQ-phobia on an institutional level. Poland’s ruling Law 
and Justice Party (PiS) has taken an openly homophobic stance, and several high-ranking 
officials, including the leader of the party (Kaczyński 2019a; 2019b) condemned 
homosexuality as a threat to Polish identity, nation and the Polish state. The incumbent 
president, Andrzej Duda, allied with the PiS party and centred his 2020 election campaign 
around homophobia, pledging to ‘defend children from LGBT ideology’ (Walker 2020). 
Almost 100 municipalities across one third of Poland adopted non-binding resolutions ‘against 
LGBT propaganda’ and declared themselves as so-called ‘LGBT free zones’ – free of ‘LGBT 
ideology’ (Kośmiński 2020). More than 80 municipalities have issued resolutions saying that 
they will not support any action encouraging tolerance to LGBTQ people, promising that they 
will not assist any NGOs working on LGBTQ issues (European Parliament 2019). The 
European Commission and the European Parliament have condemned anti-LGBT resolutions 
as a breach of fundamental values of the European Union (European Parliament 2019, 
Commissioner Dalli 2020). The right-wing media, the Polish Roman Catholic Church and the 
other anti-LGBT mobilisation groups back government’s LGBTQ-phobia and also continue to 
marginalise LGBTQ community by presenting homosexuality as a threat to Polish values 
(O’Dwyer and Vermeersch 2016; Mikulak 2019; Połońska 2019). One of the Polish 
newspapers, Gazeta Polska, distributed ‘LGBT free zone’ stickers with a cross over a rainbow 
flag2 and printed covers with titles that LGBTQ people posed a threat to children and wanted 
 
2 Image of sticker available from Wiadomosci (2019) at: https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/strefa–wolna–od–lgbt–bbc–
news–o–kontrowersyjnych–naklejkach–gazety–polskiej–6404137253619329a, consulted on 24 May 2020 
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to destroy polish values.34 Archbishop of Kraków Marek Jędraszewski condemned ‘LGBTQ 
plague’ claiming it was a disease, saying that this movement for equality and ‘so-called 
progress’ was a great threat to freedom, comparing it to the totalitarianism of the twentieth 
century on a premise of ‘radical rejection of God’ (Do Rzeczy 2019).  
Queering security in contemporary Europe for some may seem irrelevant, considering 
overall trend of greater acceptance of LGBTQ people in the majority of counties. Since 1990s 
homosexuality has been decriminalized in more than 40 countries worldwide and more than 30 
states have adopted legislation protecting LGBTQ people against hate crimes (Smith et al. 
2014). However, homophobic and transphobic violence across Europe is still widespread, and 
many EU member states still lack legislation that outlaws hate speech against people based on 
their sexual orientation (Carrol 2016: 175).  
Institutionalised LGBT-phobia has real-life consequences for LGBTQ people living in 
Poland. After the Polish government’s open anti-gay stance, reports of homophobic violence 
have increased (Godzisz and Knut 2018). In 2016 the polish parliament rejected a bill that 
would include gender, gender identity, age, disability and sexual orientation as potential 
grounds for hate crime (Gazeta Prawna 2016). According to Amnesty International, there are 
serious gaps in Polish legislation that would address homophobic and transphobic violence 
(Amnesty International 2015). In the Polish Criminal Code, there are no explicit penalty 
enhancements for crimes motivated by homophobia or anti-LGBTQ bias (Rule of Law 2020). 
According to the data and evidence gathered by NGOs, laws, police, prosecution services, and 
the criminal justice system do not adequately address homophobia (Godzisz and Knut 2018 
:2). Neither does any Polish legal framework recognise hate speech based on SOGIESC5 (2018: 
2). Besides, authorities do not systematically collect official data on crimes motivated by anti-
LGBTQ bias (2018: 7). With regards to the freedom and expression and peaceful assembly, 
there are no special provisions that would secure these freedoms for minorities and groups at 
the potential risk of discrimination (2018 :3). Since 2015, there was no campaign in public 
media on LGBTQ rights and unbiased information regarding sexual orientation and gender 
 
3 Newspaper Cover available from Gazeta Polska (2019) at: 
https://www.gazetapolska.pl/uploads/styles/archiwum–
okladka/public/okladka/5340189109406.jpg?itok=bCBERt0r, consulted on 24 May 2020 
4 Newspaper Cover available from Gazeta Polska (2019) at: 
https://www.gazetapolska.pl/uploads/styles/archiwum–
okladka/public/okladka/9919292599227.jpg?itok=yhxlCzCb, consulted on 24 May 2020 
5 SOGIESC stands for Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics (SOGIESC) is a 
project regarding legal issues affecting sexual minorities in criminal law, human rights law, anti-discrimination 
law, and family law. 
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expression is only distributed by the LGBTQ community and NGOs, without any substantial 
support from the state (2018: 3). 
Lack of awareness of queer (in)security is particularly widespread in several new 
Eastern European democracies (see IGLA Europe 2020), where under general trend of 
democratisation and overall human rights protection, queer issues remain silent. According to 
IGLA-Europe (2020) annual review on human rights of LGBTQ people, Poland ranks the 
lowest, making it the worst country in the EU for LGBTQ people. The same report (2020) 
indicated severe human rights violations of LGBTQ people in Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary ranking them the lowest in the list. Poland is a 
particularly compelling example where the juxtaposition of social context and politics actively 
(in) securitises LGBTQ individuals. With a lack of understanding of dangers faced by queer 
people, coupled with the Law and Justice Party’s homophobic rhetoric, in Poland, the problem 
of recognising LGBTQ insecurities remains salient and silent. Institutionalised homophobia 
normalises brutal street violence, terror and the hate speech against LGBTQ people (IGLA-
Europe Report on Poland 2020). Nationalist far-right groups violently attack Equality Pride 
Marches without facing significant consequences (2020 :2). Therefore, in the current context, 
the Polish LGBTQ community’s security is severely undermined.  
The academic relevance of the study stems from two main reasons: the limited 
presence of queer perspectives in security studies and the absence of studies on the LGBTQ 
community’s responses to (in)securitisation. Various scholars (Ashley 1989; Tickner 1992; 
2001; True 2005; Weber 2014; 2016; Richter-Montpetit 2017) have emphasised on 
International Relations (IR) scholarships’ silence around sexuality and gender. While there are 
few major books (Weber 2016; Picq and Theil 2015) dealing with LGBTQ problematising 
within IR, important queer works in security studies are even more limited (Wilkinson 2017a). 
Few studies (see McEvoy 2015; Wilkinson 2017b; Kramer 2017; Levon 2019) problematise 
how being queer impacts on insecurity outside heteronormative conceptions of security. 
Heteronormativity – a hegemonic discursive and social system of norms that considers 
heterosexuality as natural and superior (Robinson 2016), determines not only how security is 
defined, but also how research is conducted, what questions are asked and who is seen and 
heard (see Kerpen and Marston 2020). Going beyond heteronormativity in security studies is 
crucial because it allows us to see security problems outside the existing systems of knowledge, 
not experienced by heterosexual, cisgender individuals. Therefore, it allows LGBTQ 
populations to have a voice (see Grzanka 2020). Keeping these starting points in mind, the 
thesis ‘queers’ the concepts of security and resistance to explore security threats that LGBTQ 
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individuals face, not captured with heteronormative security framework. It also pays particular 
attention to queer community’s response to (in)securitisation and questions the tendency to 
view marginal communities as completely silenced. As a result, studying the resistance of the 
LGBTQ community against the (in)securitisation will help to understand the potential of 
agency better, that can be particularly useful in addressing the ways how marginalised groups 
can have their voice heard and included in the inclusive security framework.  
The presented study is one of the few attempts that use intersectional framework to 
analyse (in)security from queer perspective by directly engaging with the subjects of the study. 
The study takes security and resistance as the key conceptual frameworks and builds on the 
intersection of securitisation theory(ies)6 and resistance, guided by queer lens as an 
epistemological standpoint. Securitisation theory lays a foundation for a better understanding 
of the creation of insecurity discourse of the LGBTQ community. Resistance and queer theory 
are particularly useful starting points for two main reasons: First, they both take a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to security and emphasise the empowerment of individuals. Second, queer theory 
enables to employ resistance as a tool of agency in security contestation. Besides, focusing on 
resistance directs attention to silenced subjects of security against the dominant paradigm, 
while at the same time, overcomes dichotomous understanding as marginal groups as entirely 
voiceless. Thus, presented paper attempts to overcome security studies’ general tendency 
favouring top-down approaches focusing on actors with necessary symbolic and social capital 
vis á vis disempowered actors. Instead, it takes Foucauldian understanding of power and shifts 
epistemic focus from speech act to various strategies of resistance, arguing that marginal 
groups, even though with a little voice, may still have an impact on the (in)security discourse 
(Balzacq et al. 2015). 
To provide queered analysis to (in)securitisation, the study engages with two alternative 
readings of securitisation scholarship most relevant for this study: International Political 
Sociological (IPS) approach to security and poststructural feminist critique. While both 
criticisms provide useful starting points, none of them problematise ‘queerness’ in security 
analysis. The scholars working on (in)securitisation (Bigo 2001; 2014; Huysmans 2004; 2006a; 
2014; Epstein 2007; Muller 2009; Lyon 2014; Aradau 2004; Aradau and Blanke 2017) 
underline that pursuit of security can be the source of insecurity for others, but they do not 
engage how subjects cope with and overcome their structural marginalisation perpetrated by 
 
6 Some scholars (Balzacq et al. 2014) argue that there is no single Securitisation Theory, but instead several 
securitisation theories. 
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active production of (in)security (Levon 2019). Neither do they problematise (in)security for 
whom, outside the experiences of heteronormative cisgender citizens. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, no prominent research addresses (in)securitisation of LGBTQ community 
and most of the IPS studies dealing with marginal groups in security discourse are occupied 
with migration (see Husymas 1995; 2000; 2006a; Noxolo and Huysmans 2009; Huysmans and 
Buonfino 2008; Bigo et al. 2013; Aradau and Tazzioli 2020). While Hansen’s (2000) ‘silence 
security dilemma’ is one of the most cited contributions to gendered (and queered) security 
analysis, she does not further elaborate on how and in which circumstances this dilemma 
impacts (in)security and more importantly how, although lacking voice, ‘silenced’ subjects can 
make their voices heard. Overcoming shortcomings of securitisation theory with the mere 
application of its criticism without more in-depth reflection on an agency would lead to a 
dichotomic understanding of LGBTQ people as ‘threats’ or as ‘vulnerable’ subjects (see 
Huysmans 2006; Aradau 2004; Squire 2009). That is why the paper introduces resistance as a 
tool of agency in the queered analysis of (in)securitisation.  
Regarding the methodological implications, to better understand everyday lived 
experiences of queer (in)security, it is crucial to take their perspectives through the 
interpretative approach. It is also crucial to understand how they articulate (in)security and how 
they resist, considering limited access to public discourse. The bottom-up approach to security 
can be particularly useful in addressing the consequences of institutionalised homophobia in 
Poland with a significant focus on silent subjects of security – LGBTQ people.  
Thus, together with high academic relevance, the approach applied in this thesis has 
emancipatory potential and facilitates identification and response to security problems 
pertaining to LGBTQ people. This approach can bolster timely and appropriate response from 
the Polish government’s more progressive forces and other stakeholders, including 
international organisations and human rights advocacy groups. Thus, the study has the potential 
for broader societal impact, particularly for LGBTQ people living in countries with 
homophobic governments. Considering that marginalised groups have limited voice to 
articulate their (in)security, it is essential to direct attention to alternative ways of security 
contestation. Even though, the study draws on material gathered from interviews with LGBTQ 
activists living in Kraków and cannot be seen as representative of different resistance versus 
securitisation processes, the respondents of this study come from different parts of Poland, 
bringing different perspectives and experiences. While institutionalised homophobia and 
government’s securitising practises undermining the security of LGBTQ community in all 
parts of Poland, (in)securities experienced by LGBTQ people vary in more liberal-minded 
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Western and more conservative Eastern parts of Poland (Atlas of Hate7 u.d.). Considering these 
limitations, the results should be viewed as a contribution to the body of empirical studies that 
can be used in the future development of the theoretical assumptions of queered approaches in 
security studies.  
The thesis is divided into six main parts. In Chapter 1, the study examined social and 
academic relevance of the thesis with a focus on empirical and research gaps in the literature. 
After that, it also provides a brief context on securitisation and LGBTQ resistance in Poland. 
Chapter 2 constructs theoretical framework around queering the concepts of security and 
resistance for analysing the dynamics of (in)securitisation and resistance of the Polish LGBTQ 
community. Chapter 3 deals with research methodology and methods. Chapters 4 and 5 consist 
of empirical analysis of primary data which is divided into two separate but interrelated parts. 
In order to map the everyday experiences of (in)securitisation, Chapter 4 focuses on 
(in)security problems of the LGBTQ community by exploring current threats, challenges 
experienced and perceived by LGBTQ people in Poland. After mapping their security 
problems, based on their narratives, the paper explores key securitising actors in Polish queer 
(in)security discourse: the ruling Law and Justice Party, the Polish Roman Catholic Church 
and the Polish National Media. In order to show that the LGBTQ community is not a silenced 
object of discourses of (in)securitisation, but has voice/agency in the process, Chapter 5 
analyses how the LGBTQ individuals resist the institutionalised homophobia and securitising 
actors’ attempts to present the LGBTQ community as a threat. In this part, presented paper 
pays particular attention to practice (NGO memberships, attendance at Equality Pride Marches) 
and visual communicative ways (images, accessorising, memes, virals) as the non-discursive 
practices of resistance, used by the marginalised groups who have limited access to the public 
discourse. The study concludes in Chapter 6, which summarises the key findings and 
contributions of this thesis. It also engages in a broader theoretical debate on queer informed 
security framework and how it can be useful in addressing LGBTQ issues. In addition, the 
concluding chapter addresses the limitations and underlines the potential for further research.  
 
 
7 Atlas of Hate is a map that outlines regions of Poland that have adopted the ‘anti-LGBT’ resolutions. Available 
at: https://atlasnienawisci.pl/, consulted on 6 June 2020 
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1.1 Contextualising Queer (In)Security Under the PiS Party and 
Post-Soviet Syndrome in LGBTQ resistance in Poland 
While for far-rights parties’ criteria of exclusion are usually ethic, religious or cultural, 
in different contexts criteria for ‘othering’ varies (see Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2013). Polish politicians when presenting LGBTQ community as a threat, label 
gender and queer theories as ‘imported’, ‘not inherently Polish mechanisms’ (Kaczyński 
2019b), portraying LGBTQ citizens as ‘others’ (O’Dwyer and Vermeersch 2016). In the 
discursive field of security, in order to present something as a threat, it needs to be isolated 
from ‘us’ and presented as ‘other’, since conceptions of identity, of ‘self’ versus ‘other’, are 
always part of threat perceptions (Campbell 1998). Poland’s ruling party leader Jarosław 
Kaczyński (2019b) on the conference in Włocławek declared: 
 
We are dealing with a direct attack on the family, children, this sexualisation, LGBT 
movement […]. This entire movement questions any sense of belonging. It has to do 
with a certain type of ideology, a philosophy that was born earlier in the West. All of 
this, we can say, is imported to Poland. Those are not inherently Polish mechanisms. 
Today, they actually threaten our identity; they threaten our nation, our survival and 
our Polish state. (36:54)8 
 
The presented sentence is a clear example of a securitising speech act. Kaczyński 
underlined that referent objects – Polish identity, nation and Polish state, were under existential 
threat. One of the key referent objects here – something that needs to be protected is identity – 
an organising concept of societal security (Buzan et al. 1998). In societal security logic ‘we’ is 
threatened when its identity is threatened (1998 :123) since the understanding of national 
identity largely determines perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities. 
Polish national identity is closely related to Christian identity and ‘natural family 
values’– as opposed to homosexual couples (Szulc 2011). The authoritative voice of religion 
in production of LGBTQ insecurity discourse is linked to the complex role of religion in the 
politics (see Berger 1993; Grzymala-Busse 2012) and Nationalism (Hayes 2000; Ayoub 2014). 
 
8 Author’s translation from Polish. Original quote: ‘Mamy do czynienia z bezpośrednim atakiem na rodzinę, 
dzieci, ta seksualizaja, ruch LGBT, wszystko to razem gender, cały ten ruch kwestionujący jakiekolwiek 
przynależności. Oczywiście to ma związek z pewnego typu ideologią, filozofią, która zrodziła się na zachodzie 
wcześniej. To wszystko jest do Polski importowane. [...] One dzisiaj rzeczywiście zagrażają naszej tożsamości, 
naszemu narodowi, naszemu trwaniu i państwu polskiemu’. 
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Even though Poland is a secular state, the Catholic Church wields strong authority, and national 
identity is closely tied to religion (Ayoub 2014). Many studies have listed the Polish Roman 
Catholic Church as one of the major sources of homophobic pressures (Jóźko 2009; Krysz and 
Kłonkowska 2012). The privileged position of religion gives it an authoritative voice on issues 
regarding sexuality and societal security (2014: 339). Considering the strong moral authority 
of the Polish Catholic Church, politicians actively utilise ‘Catholic values’ to present 
homosexuality as a threat. As a consequence of active production of the ‘harmful other’ ruling 
party frames LGBTQ rights as external, ‘imported’ forces threatening Catholic, thus, Polish 
national values. 
By presenting the Polish state as the referent object, PiS party’s securitising move also 
operates within the political security sector. In the political security sector, Buzan et al. (1998: 
150) discuss threats and vulnerabilities concerning ideas that hold states together. Ideas that 
hold stability and political order of the state are nationalism and political ideology (1998:150). 
In Poland, notions of nationalism and political ideology overlap, both based on Polish Roman 
Catholic values (Ayoub 2014). Whatever threatens those values, is seen as a threat to the Polish 
state. Kaczyński’s words illustrate this point. He (2019b) presents LGBTQ movement as 
‘certain type of ideology, philosophy’ that poses a direct threat to polish identity, national 
values and state – thus, threatens the organisational stability of the state’s social order. 
Therefore, homosexuality is presented as a threat that calls ‘into question the position of the 
Catholic Church’ that, according to Kaczyński, is a ‘non-patriotic act’ (Niezależna 2019). As 
a result of securitisation of homosexuality and homophobic pressures, the LGBTQ 
community’s security is undermined and endangered. 
Homophobic pressures largely shape and limit the Polish LGBTQ community’s 
resistance to (in)securitisation. However, queer resistance in Poland is influenced not only by 
the current political climate but is also profoundly rooted in strict censorship and systemic 
persecution of sexual minorities during the Soviet times that made LGBTQ self-organisisation 
extremely difficult (see O’Dwyer 2012; O’Dwyer and Vermeersch 2016; Szulc 2018). As one 
LGBTQ activist (in Ayoub 2014: 339) observed, in Poland people have the Post-Soviet 
syndrome characterised in lack of trust in social partners and scepticism to NGOs, which also 
continues to influence LGBTQ resistance. 
Szulc (2018) briefly summarises debate on the LGBTQ people in Poland: ‘gay men 
appeared in Poland for the first time in 1989, after the fall of Communism; lesbians always 
were – and still are – ‘just friends’; trans people are funny freaks in the entertainment business 
and queer…but who are they, anyway?’ (:159). He argues that these stereotypical views reflect 
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a general level of understanding of LGBTQ individuals in Polish society and even within the 
Polish LGBTQ community itself. Before the 1980s, during the communist times, LGBTQ 
individuals were invisible, with a couple of exceptions when lesbians or gay men were involved 
in ‘spicy criminal stories’ (2018 :160). In the Eastern bloc, Poland included, gays and lesbians 
were often presented as spies and traitors to the nation, as objects with immoral sexuality who 
collaborated with the West (2018 :160). Thus, not surprisingly, many LGBTQ individuals 
remained in the closet. Brutal state mechanisms forced LGBTQ individuals to remain invisible 
in order to protect themselves. 
Emerging LGBTQ movement in the early 1980s had not transformed into an organised 
resistance. Later, an operation with code-name ‘Hyacinth’ against LGBTQ people launched by 
Polish communists from 1985 to 1987 served as ‘catalytic event’ which triggered the beginning 
of more organised Polish LGBT movement, and after 1985, a couple of gay and lesbian 
organisations were launched, and several LGBT magazines began to be published (Szulc 
2018). They operated illegally and were able to officially register only after the collapse of the 
Polish People’s Republic.  
In the newly established Democratic Republic of Poland, minorities, including LGBTQ 
people, became more visible in Polish society (Mucha 1997). Topics of sex and sexuality 
sparked serious political and social debates and polarised Polish society (Szulc 2011). Since 
the beginning of early 2000s, upon Poland’s EU accession talks, LGBT activists and few 
politicians launched several initiatives including the first ‘Equality Parade’ in Warsaw in 2001 
and campaign ‘Let Them See Us’. The campaign was launched by the biggest Polish LGBTQ 
organisation Campaign Against Homophobia. It aimed to spread LGBTQ awareness by 
exhibiting posters of same-sex couples holding hands. With time, the visibility of the LGBTQ 
community increased, and so did the polarisation over the issue (Szulc 2018). Thus, today, the 
complex juxtaposition of the historical context and current politics, make Poland a compelling 
example to study (in)securitisation of the LGBTQ community and their resistance to 





2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework: Queering 
the Concepts 
As briefly discussed in the introduction, LGBTQ people have generally been rendered 
invisible in International Relations and particularly in Security Studies. This has been the case 
because of two main reasons. The first and more general explanation is that until the late 1980s 
security discourse maintained the focus on the state-centred level of analysis and individuals’ 
security was disregarded. Second, even after growing emphasis on an individual level of 
analysis, LGBTQ security has been understood through the heteronormative framework, 
ignoring specific and unique security problems experienced by the LGBTQ populations. These 
communities who are often marginalised and limited in their ability to articulate their insecurity 
to a broader public are often excluded from security agenda.  
Before proceeding to further analyses, key concepts should be defined. Central to this 
thesis are notions of security and resistance – LGBTQ community’s resistance to government’s 
securitising attempts. Prefix (in) is used not only to reflect on lack of security for queer 
individuals but also to underline, that security for some, may imply insecurity for others (see 
Bigo 2001; Bigo and Tsoukala 2006). To explore security problems of queer individuals in 
Poland, the study draws together literature from security studies and resistance guided through 
an emancipatory queer lens. Thus, the paper takes notions of gender and sexuality as analytical 
tools and empirical categories. 
The literature on how being LGBTQ person impacts on experiences of security and 
insecurity is extremely limited. Security as one’s feeling of being safe is not only about being 
protected from live threatening menaces on a local, national or international level (Wilkinson 
2017a). According to the broad conceptualisation, security is one’s freedom ‘to live in dignity’, 
protected from violence and hatred (UNDP 1994). It is also about having financial and labour 
protections against discrimination (1994). Since security can mean different things to different 
people, in different contexts (Gallie 1956; Booth ed. 2005; Collier at al. 2006), it is essential to 
allow those who are vulnerable, to put forward their understanding of security. Importance of 
the context also leads to an assumption that security, as a concept, has no ‘essence’ and ‘the 
right question is not what security means, but what it does’ (Balzacq et al. 2009 in Bigo: 124). 
That is why, instead of suggesting precise conceptualisation of security, this paper leaves it to 
emerge from the interview data. The hope is that giving voice to the subjects of this study can 
provide the most appropriate queered conceptualisation, focusing on the LGBTQ community’s 
everyday experiences of (in)security.  
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The thesis acknowledges that definition and measurement of resistance in relation to 
LGBTQ populations is problematic, given their unique lived experiences and their limited 
access to the public discourse (Colpitts and Gahagan 2016). Therefore, tools of resistance 
available to LGBTQ communities is different from heteronormative models and requires 
further theorising. For this reason, the paper takes a broad understanding of resistance 
combining various individual and collective practises leaves the meaning, practices and forms 
of resistance to emerge from the data.  
The paper uses ‘queer’ as an umbrella term to entail broad scope of identifications, 
sexual and gender practises that cannot be captured by categories of LGBT (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender) and other two-gender binary identities. The term ‘homosexual’ has 
clinical connotation and is used only in order to capture the negative framing of LGBTQ people 
– therefore, it is used in negative discursive framing referring to discriminatory practices. At 
the same time ‘queer’ refers to theoretical and analytical model – a ‘queer theory’ as a school 
of thought (Butler 1994: 21; Halperin 1995: 113). Therefore, the following paper uses ‘queer’ 
not only as an umbrella term of referring to gender and sexual identifiers, but also as an 
epistemological standpoint, lens through which security and resistance are examined. 
To lay the foundation for queer informed analysis of LGBTQ individuals’ (in)security 
in Poland, the chapter proceeds as follows: the literature review starts with a brief discussion 
on the deepening and widening of the concept of security. Then, it moves to briefly examine 
main contours of epistemological and ontological assumptions of securitisation framework, 
and how its assumptions, although limited in their analytical usefulness, can benefit queer 
analyses of security. Then it moves to the problematisation of agency in security discourse and 
explores resistance as a tool of agency of the marginal voices.  
 
2.1. Queering (in)Security 
Until the end of Cold War the concept of security maintained the focus on military 
threats (Charrett 2009) and security was inextricably knitted to the state and its sovereignty 
(Krause and Williams 1996). Since the late 1980s with post-positivist attacks on mainstream 
approaches (Buzan 1984; Haftendorn 1991; Tickner 1992; Smith et al. 1996), scholars started 
to criticise Traditionalists for the state-centred level of analyses. This period also coincided 
with a more robust emergence of human rights discourse. With the birth of critical approaches, 
scholars started to talk about the widening of the concept of security (referred as horizontal 
expansion) and how this also brings deepening of the concept – a re-evaluation of the referent 
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subjects of security (vertical expansion) (Williams 2011). The latter implied expansion of 
referent objects downward, from society to groups and ultimately individuals. As a result, 
driven and facilitated by these two processes, security agenda opened up to various non-
military issues (Kakonen 1994; Buzan 1984; Price-Smith 2001). 
Even though new approaches widened security agenda beyond the military realm and 
brought into focus individuals as referent objects of security, many insecurities experienced by 
a wide variety of groups remained on the fringes of academia. Even in countries with the most 
inclusive and tolerant societies with progressive legislation, the feeling of security is 
profoundly shaped by one’s gender identity and sexual orientation (Wilkinson 2017a: 106).  
Several authors (Kramer 2017; Hagen 2017; Baker 2017) attempted to deconstruct the 
understanding of security for the queer people. Kramer (2017) deconstructs new configurations 
of security – how queer experiences confound and complicate state-citizen relationships, 
focusing on the community’s collective resistance to the state. Hagen (2017) focuses on queer 
security in post-conflict settings and calls for an inclusive perspective on security studies. 
Catherine Baker (2017: 109) draws attention to everyday insecurities of queer people amid 
2016 American presidential elections and underlines how hegemonic masculine white power 
can threaten partial and limited security of LGBTQ people. Baker (:110) argues that straight, 
cisgender man and women under peacetime circumstances find it difficult to understand 
everyday insecurities of the LGBTQ people. 
Considering the differences in experiences of security and insecurity by marginal 
populations, some scholars (Hudson 2009) started to ask the question ‘how does the security 
framework help to bring attention to issues and groups of people that are normally 
marginalised?’ (: 53). This question is especially relevant when discussing insecurities 
experienced by marginalised groups – particularly LGBTQ populations. Answering this 
question is further complicated when the government, generally considered as a provider of 
security who can apply and exercise the security framework, instead of protecting, is the source 
of insecurity. That is why, understanding of security should be broadened beyond the 
heteronormative framework, capturing everyday security problems of queer individuals. 
 
2.1.1 Towards ‘Queer Informed’ Security Framework: Theor(ies) of 
Securitisation 
For the purpose of ‘queering’ securitisation, the paper engages with poststructuralist 
feminist critique (Hansen 2000) and so-called PARIS school’s problematisation of (in)security 
informed by broader International Political Sociology (CASE Collective 2006; Bigo and 
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Walker 2007; Balzacq et al. 2010; Tugba et al. 2017). To better understand the dynamics 
surrounding (in)securitisation of homosexuality, first, the intersubjective discursive 
construction of threat should be examined. For this purpose, the section below briefly discusses 
Securitization Theory9 in its original conception, engages in its shortcomings and brings in the 
critiques by so-called ‘second generation’ of securitisation scholarship. 
Securitisation Theory (ST) developed by the so-called Copenhagen School (CS) is one 
of the most influential approaches in contemporary critical security studies. It provides a tool 
of analyses of security policies (Weaver 1995; Buzan et al., 1998) and constitutes a top-down 
approach that focuses on the discursive relationship between securitising actor and the audience 
(Ruggie 1998: 866). Securitisation is a so-called speech act – a rhetorical process that 
establishes what is to be considered as a security threat, by moving an issue to an extreme 
version of politicisation (Buzan et al. 1998:21). If the audience accepts the securitising move, 
an issue becomes securitised (Buzan et al. 1998). Acceptance of the audience enables 
policymakers to adopt whatever means they consider appropriate to deal with this threat in a 
particular context (Balzacq and Guzzini 2014: 4). Engaging in the discussion whether in Poland 
homosexuality is successfully securitised or not, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, it 
focuses on examining consequences of the Polish government’s securitising move – presenting 
LGBTQ ‘ideology’ as the existential threat to a referent object (in this case, Polish nation, 
Polish values, traditional Polish family) – on the real life (in)security of LGBTQ community, 
without ‘an objective or quantifiable’ definition of successful securitisation.  
Securitisation framework is relevant for this study because ‘classical Copenhagen 
version’ (Wæver 2014: 30) of securitisation theory overcomes materialist ontology of 
dominant rationalist theories of security studies by focusing on intersubjectivity of threat 
construction, questioning the assumption that securitising actors respond to ‘objective’ 
problems in the real world. In addition, ST’s conceptual toolkit on the creation of (in)security 
discourse is useful in analysing by whom (in)security is created and practised. To queer 
security, one needs to address who is ‘speaking’ security. 
Buzan et al. (1998) distinguish between securitising actors and functional actors. 
Securitising actor is an individual or a group who can ‘securitise an issue, by declaring 
something – referent object – as existentially threatened’ (1998 :36). Identifying securitising 
actors is complicated since it involves level-of-analysis problem – any collective can be 
 
9 With capital letters Securitisation Theory (ST) refers to Copenhagen School’s tradition, as conceived by Ole 
Weaver, while securitisation theory(ies) refer to various authors’ contributions and second generations of the 
securitisation scholarship 
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disaggregated to into subunits and individuals (1998 :40). Thus, designating the Polish 
government as the main securitising actor is arbitrary, since it includes various subunits, 
bureaucracies and individuals. One possible way to overcome this problem could have been to 
focus on security speech acts of individual politicians, for example, leader of the PiS party 
Jarosław Kaczyński and several other high-ranking officials, but this could have been even 
more problematic for two main reasons. First, it is not helpful to disaggregate collectives into 
individuals, because the social life is better understandable though methodological collectivism 
(Buzan et al. 1998 :40). Second, since the study focuses on perceptions of LGBTQ individuals, 
for them, it would have been easier to talk about how government as a collective is influencing 
their everyday security than concrete individuals. Since the most common securitising actors 
are governments and political leaders, for analytical convenience, when referring to the Polish 
government, the paper focuses on the ruling Law and Justice party. 
Thus, despite its conceptual and analytical usefulness, ST is primarily concerned with 
discursive practices of actors in power positions, who can speak on behalf of whom or what 
they deem worthy of protection. Actors who are marginal or have limited voice are excluded 
from security analysis. As a result, the ST has been widely criticised for moral and political 
ambiguity (Aradau 2004; Floyd 2019), lack of sociological approach (Huysmans 2002; 
McSweeney 1996; Balzacq 2005; 2014; Bigo 2014) and absence of gender (Hansen 2000). To 
sum up, while Securitization Theory provides useful tools of analysis of discursive construction 
of threat, it is problematic from the point of capturing everyday insecurities and resistance of 
marginal communities. That is why, to queer securitisation, or more accurately – 
(in)securitisation, the thesis brings in the feminist critique of Copenhagen School’s 
Securitization Theory and IPS problematisation of (in)security. 
The feminist critique of CS is based on epistemological and theoretical grounds (see 
Hansen 2000). While CS does not exclude the possibility of security being spoken on behalf 
of vulnerable groups, only actors with power can decide whose security matters. Thus, with its 
epistemological reliance on speech act, ST’s excludes threats faced by marginalised groups 
who are often invisible, lack access to official discourses and have limited ability to openly 
speak about their (in)security (Hansen 2000). Two aspects are important in this regard. When 
marginalised groups are deprived of their ability to voice their insecurity’ security as silence’ 
occurs (Hansen 2006: 287). When faced with ‘silent security dilemma’, speaking up can 
aggravate insecurity (2000). The second aspect relates to Hansen’s critique of 
conceptualisation of the referent object in ST. The most relevant to gendered or queered 
insecurity is societal security sector, which according to Buzan et al. (1998) is about ‘large, 
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self-sustaining identity groups’ (cited in Hansen 2000:297). It is problematic to discuss 
LGBTQ community in these terms, which is nether ‘large’ nor ‘self-sustaining’.  
Together with the feminist critique, the second important theoretical ground for 
understanding the creation of insecurity for the LGBTQ community comes from International 
Political Sociology. PARIS school also problematises’ ‘classical’ ST and argues that 
securitisation – while aiming to create conditions of security for some – simultaneously creates 
conditions of insecurity for others (Bigo 2001). This realisation is important because by 
constructing the LGBTQ community as a threat, securitising actors create subjects of insecurity 
– LGBTQ community itself. Therefore, PARIS-IPS approach is relevant for queered security 
analysis for four main reasons:  
First, IPS considers both security and insecurity as the products of (in)securitisation 
process (Bigo and McCluskey 2018). The (in)securitisation framework offers a fascinating 
insight for this study, focusing on how ‘pursuing security’– protecting Polish state, nation and 
identity (see Kaczyński 2019a, 2019b) from homosexuality creates insecurity for LGBTQ 
people. Thus, security claims not only prioritise whose security is the most important and what 
needs to be protected, but also decide whose security is sacrificed or ignored (see Bigo and 
Walker 2007; Bigo 2014). IPS is particularly relevant for this study because it directs attention 
to everyday processes and practices of (in)securitisation and lived experiences of people 
affected by security practices (Bigo and McCluskey 2018). IPS focuses on ‘what security 
does’, putting the consequences of (in)securitisation in the spotlight. By doing so, this approach 
pays particular attention to lives considered marginal or unimportant to International Relations 
or political science (2018: 120).  
Second, the IPS approach is useful for queering (in)securitisation because it 
problematises the difference (see Bigo and Tsoukala 2007; Huysmans 1995; 2006; Bigo and 
McCluskey 2018). Bigo (2001 :100) claims that any structural phenomenon can be transformed 
into an adversary and everything can be turned into the object of insecurity – any difference 
can be securitised that may undermine a homogenous societal identity as perceived and 
fantasised by those in power. He argues that ‘securitisation does not affect survival but rather 
intolerance toward differences’ (2001 :100). From this starting point, homosexuality is 
perceived as a threat not because it threatens the survival of society and its identity, but because 
everyday life is politicised and securitised through disciplining the body (Foucault 1979). 
Within this logic, insider becomes outsider and LGBTQ community is presented as an enemy 
within. 
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Third, from IPS perspective, concepts should be understood in relation to specific 
localised contexts within different configurations of the power (Bigo 2001 :120). In different 
contexts, LGBTQ individuals’ (in)security discourse is radically different. Thus, a context-
informed approach is particularly useful. Assuming that concepts are only significant only in 
relation to localised contexts, paper leaves the content of ‘security’ open to emerging from data 
as defined and experienced by the subjects of this study. 
A fourth important aspect of PARIS problematisation for queer security analysis is that 
it claims to focus on experiences of marginal groups not determined by the elite discourses, but 
by the ‘practices revealing resistances to or escape from the power’ (Bigo and McCluskey 
2018: 120). This element is particularly important for current analysis which engages in an 
understanding of power and resistance to securitisation in Foucauldian sense.  
To summarise, both the poststructuralist feminist critique of securitisation theory and 
IPS provide useful starting points, but they do not further problematise the role of agency in 
security analysis. While theories of (in)securitisation underline that pursuit of security (here 
for heteronormative cisgender citizens) can be a source of insecurity for others, they do not 
engage how subjects cope with and overcome their structural marginalisation perpetrated by 
active production of (in)security (see Levon 2019). Besides, the key scholars working with IPS 
approach (for example Huysmans, Bigo, Tugba) almost exclusively focus on migration and to 
the best of the author’s knowledge none of them ever focused on gendered or queered 
(in)security.  
In addition, methodically, IPS is less concerned with (in)security as perceived and 
experienced by those who have no say in security discourse. The problem here is that despite 
these claims, PARIS approach refuses to undertake ‘small ethnographic fieldwork projects in 
the name of methodological pluralism’ (Bigo and McCluskey 2018 :121). Thus, IPS claims to 
speak about everyday lived (in)security on behalf of people who are not given a say in IPS’s 
methodological rigour. If criticism of CS is based on its top-down approach on security, IPS 
follows the same tradition and can be criticised for giving security scholars to much authority 
to speak on behalf of those who are ‘considered marginal or unimportant to IR’ (2018 :121).  
Even though IPS directs attention to security practices that render some people 
insecure, it ties security to autorotative actors arguing that ‘security meanings depend on 
politics and the legitimisation strategies of dominant actors’ (Bigo 2008:123). Following this 
logic, PARIS school’s approach is concerned with mundane bureaucratic practices, Weberian 
politics of rationalisation and use of technologies in the process of (in)securitisation, focusing 
on discursive and non-discursive practices of ‘professionals of security’ (Bigo and McCluskey 
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2018). Thus, IPS remains a top-down approach without a particular interest in un-silencing the 
silenced subjects of security. Bigo (2008 :128) only superficially mentions resistance as a 
possibility to unmake (in)security that entails disruption of the ‘regime of truth’ created by 
various actors operating in the field of security. To overcome this gap, the study suggests 
introducing resistance as a tool of agency in the contestation of security as used and utilised by 
the subjects of this study. 
While Hansen’s ‘silence security dilemma’ is one of the most cited contributions to 
gendered (and queered) security analysis, she does not further elaborate on how and in which 
circumstances this dilemma impacts on insecurity and more importantly how although lacking 
voice, ‘silenced’ subjects can make their voices heard. In addition, Hansen’s assumptions based 
on empirical cases of Bosnia and Pakistan cannot be applied to LGBTQ insecurity discourse 
in EU member states for one main reason: despite active production of ‘silence’ from 
authoritative speakers, civic society and international human rights organisations have a 
broader scope. Therefore, even marginal groups may be entitled to, even though limited, 
insecurity articulation.  
Since the problematisation of invisible subjects of security who paradoxically are 
created by the very process of securitisation is the primary focus of this study, the concept of 
resistance is brought into an analysis, giving agency to otherwise ‘silenced’ subjects of 
security. Considering that both IPS and feminist critique of securitisation do not elaborate on 
the emancipatory aspect of resistance, the study brings in the concept to overcome 
understanding of marginal groups as wholly silenced. This move would enable facilitation of 
security problems outside the dominant paradigms and help to detect marginal voices, allowing 
them to have their voices heard in shaping inclusive security agenda. 
 
2.1.2 Section Summary 
This section provided a brief discussion of securitisation scholarship and its criticisms 
that lay the foundation to queer security analysis. It also addressed how individual level of 
analysis was brought into the focus and how this move also enabled the inclusion of LGBTQ 
people as individual referent objects of security. Securitisation theories and (in)securitisation 
scholarship provide useful concepts for the presented study. However, major theories of 
securitisation downplay on the role of agency of securitised subjects and instead focus on top-
down discursive practices that shape (in)security. Therefore, to include queer perspective, 
securitisation scholarship should address not only the process of (in)securitisation performed 
by authoritative actors, but also securitised subjects’ understanding of the consequences of 
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securitising moves and the resistance strategies that can be seen as their voice in the security 
discourse. As a result, queering (in)securitisation can offer an insight into security dynamics 
and the role of agency, influencing security practices. 
 
2.2 From Queering Security to Queering Resistance 
The previous chapter briefly discussed securitisation theory and its criticisms from two 
perspectives most relevant to this thesis. A meaningful relationship between resistance and 
securitisation can be observed in how they see agency in LGBTQ security discourse. 
Overcoming shortcomings of securitisation theory with the mere application of its criticism 
without more in-depth reflection on the agency would lead to the dichotomic understanding of 
LGBTQ people as ‘threats’ or ‘vulnerable’ subjects (see Huysmans 2006; Aradau 2004; Squire 
2009). Approaching LGBTQ people as disempowered victims would further perpetuate 
systemic violence and mistreatment. That is why for queering security, it is particularly 
important to focus on resistance as a form of security contestation.  
 
2.2.1 Conceptualising Resistance 
‘Where is the Power, there is Resistance.’ 
Michel Foucault (1966: 125) 
The previous chapter highlighted the importance of lived experiences of marginal 
groups in security debates. Contesting (in)securitisation is the second important aspect of this 
paper. The presented study explores one particular type of resistance, the resistance of the 
marginalised group against oppressive practices and discourses. This element is particularly 
important for current analysis which engages in the understanding of power and resistance in 
Foucauldian sense. 
From Plato to Luther and Calvin, from Locke to Marx, many scholars have been 
interested in practices of resistance (Balzacq 2015: 11). However, the study of resistance in 
academia was popularised only in the 1980s, as a result of so-called cultural turn (2015: 11). 
Initially, scholars emphasised on the strategies and goals of social movements as a form of 
resistance to mainstream politics. In securitisation scholarship, term resistance is only briefly 
or curiously mentioned and is nether systematically explicated nor theorised (Stritzel 2015). 
Only recently Balzacq’s (2015) edited book attempted to address this void exploring the place 
of resistance within securitisation studies. In this book, several authors (Balzacq 2015; Marx 
2015; Vuori 2015; Piazza 2015; Blanc 2015) compare and assess how resistance as strategy 
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and as a practice relates to security’s logic in different cultural, social and political settings. 
These studies also show that different issues have conflicting results depending on the practices 
of resistance and the context.  
Conversely, resistance has been an academic buzzword in queer studies focusing on 
various practices as forms of queer resistance (see Cohen 2004; McDonald 2008; Croft et al. 
2017; Rodríguez de Ruiz 2017). Queer theory is often defined precisely as resistance to norms 
and heteronormativity (Jakobsen 1988; Warner 1993; Halperin 1990, 1995). Gary Kinsman 
and Patrizia Gentile (2010), in their book ‘The Canadian War on Queers: National Security 
and Sexual Regulation’, challenge Canadian historiography on the state-sanctioned war on 
queer people in the latter half of the twentieth century. They take the methodology of 
‘sociology form below’ and based on narratives of people affected by national security 
agencies, explore how queer people were surveilled, blackmailed and marginalised under the 
pretext of National Security (2010: 30). Kingsman and Gentile also draw attention to how queer 
communities were trying to resist to state-sanctioned oppressive security practises. 
However, the literature on queer resistance in security studies is extremely limited (see 
Daniel and Berwick 2020) due to the overall lack of queer perspectives in security studies  and 
security scholars’ tendency of favouring top-down approaches. In IR, resistance was regarded 
as a counter-politics against oppressive discourse (Balzacq 2015: 12). Even though defining 
resistance as the relationship between powerful and powerless may seem like the most 
convincing formulation, Balzacq (2015) tried to overcome this tendency and criticised 
Derridian (1976) approach to capturing power and resistance as the binary opposition between 
those who have power and dominate and those who resist. He claims, resistance should be 
conceptualised outside domination, and power should be seen neither in only destructive terms 
nor attributed to only dominating force (2015: 11), calling for the conception of resistance as 
non-binary practice. 
Problematisation of Derridian approach to resistance is crucial for ‘un-silencing’ queer 
voices in security discourse. Because the shift towards Foucauldian conceptualisation of 
resistance emphasises its emancipatory potential. Foucault defines power as ‘multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in the sphere where they operate’ (1979: 92). He argues that power 
does not necessarily come top-down, from authoritative institutions, for example, the 
government or the state, but it is dispersed – ‘comes from everywhere’. This theoretical 
assumption allows taking resistance as an expression of agency in the security discourse. 
Therefore, presented paper, holds a view that resistance is also a manifestation of the bottom-
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up flow of power which can undermine, challenge and question the dominant discourse that 
(in) securitises LGBTQ individuals.  
Counter-securitisation or desecuritisation may seem like the obvious links between 
securitisation and resistance. Stritzel (2015) had one of the first to attempt to theorise and 
conceptually specify counter-securitisation within securitisation theory, discussing it is a move 
of resistance against securitisation. However, he discusses counter-securitising moves in the 
same linguistic illocutionary logic as Copenhagen School does with a securitising move (see 
2015 :552), reaching the same gridlock of silencing marginal groups. At the same time, it would 
be wrong to treat all practices of LGBTQ community’s resistance as counter-securitisation, 
since it is hard to see the line between counter-securitisation, de-securitisation and resistance, 
which would require extensive theorising. Therefore, the presented paper uses resistance as a 
generic term that includes various practises of contesting the power, including counter-
securitisation and de-securitisation through various symmetrical or asymmetrical means.  
 
2.1.2 Analytical Model: Problematising Agency – Queer Security Dilemma and 
‘Hidden Transcripts’ of Resistance 
Access to security discourse requires visibility and voice (see Hansen 2000). Since 
(in)security of invisible subjects is the primary focus of this study, the concept of resistance is 
brought into analysis, discussed as an expression of agency of otherwise ‘silenced’ subjects of 
security. However, while heteronormative understanding of resistance requires the ability to 
‘speak up’ and to be visible, for many queer individuals security depends on one question – 
‘do you pass? – meaning how well one can hide their queerness and act ‘normal’ (Wilkinson 
2017b: 114). Passing is a form of ‘stigma management’, a sociological concept adopted by 
Erving Goffman (1963: 50) which deals with how individuals of a deviant social identity 
attempt to avoid marginalisation by not revealing their stigmatised identity. To be able to ‘pass’ 
means performing gender and sexuality in a way that falls into heteronormativity. While the 
ability to openly ‘speak security’ in many cases is a privilege, many LGBTQ people face a 
dilemma between speaking up and endangering themselves or remaining silent (Richardson 
2017). Therefore, remaining closeted is a necessary strategy to be safe as individual bodies 
(Kramer 2017). Hence, there is a trade-off between silence and invisibility on the one hand and 
voice and visibility on the other. Even though ‘acting straight’ can protect queer individuals, 
‘closet is not a site of security’ since only visibility can grant the queer community access to 
security discourse (Sedgwick 1991 in Kramer 2017: 121). 
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According to Wilkinson (2017a :115), the centrality of passing for queer security is a 
manifestation and result of security as both practise and experience privileging 
heteronormativity. This is also a manifestation that ST’s epistemological reliance on speech 
act ignores the security problems of marginalised populations who often face a security 
dilemma. Therefore, the visibility/invisibility dilemma is particularly relevant in the criticism 
of securitisation theory. If securitisation theories favour authoritative speakers in ‘speaking’ 
security – discursively constructing what the threat is and who/what needs to be protected, for 
queer approach, one needs to focus on different non-discursive ways of (in)security articulation 
not found in official public and political discourses. 
Security dilemma faced by queer individuals is one of the reasons why mapping 
LGBTQ insecurity discourse is difficult, because many queer people choose to remain closeted 
in order to protect themselves from structural violence and discrimination. Since ‘speaking up’ 
may endanger marginal groups, many of them use alternative ways of security articulation. 
That is why ‘silence security dilemma’ should be shifted to visibility/invisibility dilemma – 
questioning what it means to ‘speak up’ while resisting (in)securitisation. Expansion of the 
focus to more hidden ways of security contestation was dictated by acknowledging, what the 
author calls here, a ‘queer security dilemma’, which is about the irreconcilable paradox 
between conditional security of invisibility and ability to have one’s voice heard. Since 
‘security simultaneously requires both visibility and invisibility’ (Richardson 2017: 119), this 
dilemma impacts not only conditions of security, but also the choices and strategies of 
resistance. Epistemologically this shift to visibility/invisibility can be significant in 
acknowledging various alternative ways of security articulation with the focus on practice, 
visuals and items-that by themselves do not ‘speak’ up but are used at increasing visibility. 
Resistance as a conceptual tool found in social movements and resistance literature may serve 
this goal.  
In the 1990s, James C. Scott’s (1990) in his book, ‘Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance’ introduced the concept of ‘hidden transcripts’ in opposite to public expression, to 
examine ideological resistance of the marginalised groups to the dominant power structures by 
using various aesthetics, their anonymity and ambiguity. Scott’s analyses include various 
aesthetics such as folklore, songs, jokes, theatre, gossip as forms of resistance. Two aspects of 
hidden transcripts, as defined by Scott, can be useful in analyses of queer resistance. First, Scott 
argues that hidden transcripts are specific to particular actors and a given social site. The second 
and more critical aspect of hidden transcripts is that they do not contain only speech acts ‘but 
23 
a whole range of practices’ (1990: 14). Therefore, the concept of hidden transcripts opens up 
wide conceptual variety to explore queer resistance to (in)securitisation. 
The epistemological shift from speech act to other forms of security articulation opens 
the question of what sources should the researcher use to find ‘hidden transcripts’, that are not 
easily found ‘out there’. Most of the material studies on securitisation draw on textual 
documents: politicians’ speeches, government documents and media sources. This means that 
in practice, in security discourse, only the agency of authoritative actors is considered. Digital 
age enables marginalised communities to use various alternative ways of security expression. 
In recent years there has been a visual turn in security studies, and a number of scholars 
(Williams 2003; Campbell 2004; Hansen 2008; 2011a; 2011b) started to focus on visual 
communication as a way of security articulation. Despite active production of silencing of 
LGBTQ populations under homophobic governments, silence is contested by visibility and not 
all marginal groups choose to remain invisible. Practises such as Equality Pride Marches, 
demonstrations and visibility campaigns also play the role in contesting (in)securitisation. 
Therefore, the study offers a novel approach to security articulation and pays particular focus 
to practice (protests, demonstrations, marches) and visuals (images, memes, virals) as the tools 
of agency used by marginalised groups who have limited access to the public discourse.  
Another critical aspect of queering securitisation is that of methodological and relates 
to the overall lack of bottom-up approaches in securitisation framework. Many securitisation 
scholarships analyse insecurity of certain groups, without engaging with them (see Husymans 
2006; Hansen 2006). The security scholars often refuse to engage with people’s perceptions 
and their understandings of (in)security and consider ethnographic fieldwork as ‘add-on to IR 
theorists in the name of methodological pluralism’ (see Bigo and McCluskey 2018 :121). Thus, 
an important implication of queering security and resistance rests on the subjects own 
understanding of (in)securitisation and resistance. That is why paper puts forward the 
interpretative approach, putting subjects of the study at the centre of inquiry. Considering that 
marginalised groups can use multiple types of performativity, the presented paper takes broad 
conceptualisation of resistance and leaves it to emerge from the data.  
 
2.2.3 Section Summary 
This section provided a summary of the literature on resistance and emphasised on 
several concepts that can be useful for queered analyses of security and resistance in Poland. It 
holds that Polish LGBTQ people resistance strategies to (in)securitsation should be studied 
outside the heteronormative framework taking into account the security dilemma that LGBTQ 
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individuals face in access to visibility in public discourses. It also argued that understanding of 
resistance in Foucauldian sense might empower silenced subjects of security to make their 
voices heard and be included in security agenda. To better understand everyday lived 
(in)security of queer community, it is crucial to take their own perspectives through the 
interpretative approach. That is why it is crucial to understand how they articulate security 
problems and how they resist, considering their limited access to public discourse. From these 



























3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Design Frame and Case Selection 
The presented paper takes a case study as a design frame that incorporates interviewing 
as the primary method for data collection. It offers a case-oriented approach, providing ‘an in-
depth exploration from multiple perspectives’ (Thomas 2011 :443). Case study best fits the 
research agenda when it focuses on how specific phenomenon unfolds in a particular context 
(Thomas 2011). The subject of the presented study is Polish LGBTQ community, while the 
object of the study – theoretical frame of the social inquiry – is resistance under insecurity. 
According to Gary Thomas (2011), the subject should be selected because it offers ‘an 
interesting or unusual or revealing example’ that explicates the object of the study (:514). 
Presented study takes Polish LGBTQ community as a subject because it provides a unique and 
interesting phenomenon of resistance under insecurity – securitisation of homosexuality by the 
government in a developed, liberal country – in the country, that is a member of the European 
Union. Polish LGBTQ community has been chosen as the subject of this study following three 
routes, as suggested by Thomas (2011). The first route is researcher’s familiarity with the 
subject. Thomas (2011: 514) calls it a local knowledge case. Second, the subject can be chosen 
because of the inherent interest in the case – meaning it may be a key case. Third, the subject 
may be outlier case – it may explicate the object by being different and unique. The subject of 
this study – Polish LGBTQ community was selected because of a partial combination of all 
three routes. One of the reasons, however, not the most important, was the author’s 
specialisation in the region and future academic interests. Second and third routes of selection 
are discussed in greater detail.  
Even though Polish LGBTQ community may not represent a key case of resistance 
under insecurity, it does provide a fascinating insight into queer community’s historical 
struggle and resistance against oppressive governments, starting from Polish People’s Republic 
(PRL) under the communist regime to present-day democratic Poland, with the right-wing 
ruling Law and Justice party in power. In this regard, the choice was dictated by two main 
reasons: by Polish historical context and actuality of the current debates on LGBTQ rights in 
Poland. Poland has a relatively short history of the LGBTQ movement, which means tolerance 
to gender minorities is not yet a finished project (Warkocki 2014). Upon EU accession talks, 
issues around LGBT rights were included in public and political discussions that created a 
backlash between liberal and conservative-minded forces in Poland (Szulc 2018). With time, 
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the Polish LGBT movement has become better organised and started to engage with the wider 
public. At the same time, right-wing political parties, the National Media, the Catholic Church 
and anti-gay mobilisation groups continue to marginalise LGBTQ people by presenting them 
as threats to Polish identity and values (Kubica 2009; Kościańska 2012). To summarise, the 
Polish case presents an interesting example of securitisation of homosexuality, from 
securitising move – explicitly articulated by ruling party representatives, to LGBTQ 
community’s resistance.  
Third and most importantly Polish LGBTQ community’ resistance under insecurity is 
an outlier case. The government of Poland is openly homophobic in a liberal democratic state, 
a member of the European Union, adhering to human rights protection. Therefore, the 
presented case represents a compelling example of the resistance of the LGBTQ community 
under various homophobic pressures and their fight for security in a country that otherwise 
would have been considered ‘secure’. With the emergence of far-right parties across Europe 
and discriminatory discourses gaining prominence, it is important to examine how the security 
of marginal groups can be undermined by (in)securitising practises and how they can have their 
voices heard and their rights upheld. 
The fieldwork was conducted in a Polish city Kraków for several reasons. It is the 
second-largest city in Poland, with around ten universities. Since Kraków is considered as a 
‘student city’, it attracts the students from entire Poland, guarantying diverse opinions and more 
representativity of the sample. Besides, Kraków is a place of growing LGBTQ grassroots 
activism and resistance. Even though authorities of Lesser Poland province, where Kraków is 
located adopted resolutions declaring the province as ‘LGBT-free zone’, and despite the efforts 
from local PiS party representatives and anti-LGBTQ lobbying groups, Kraków city Council 
rejected these resolutions. Thus, while Kraków is located in the province which has been 
declared as ‘LGBT-free zone’, it is also the place of an increasing number of LGBTQ 
organisations and queer-friendly public spaces, fostering queer resistance under open 
(in)securitisation. 
 
3.2. Research Questions and Aims 
The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of dynamics surrounding 
(in)securitisation of LGBTQ community and explore possibilities of inclusion of queer voices 
in security agenda by focusing on the emancipatory and empowering potential of resistance. 
Thus, to address the ways how marginalised groups can have more voice and agency to be 
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included in an inclusive queer informed conception of security. To serve this goal, the study 
formulates two main research questions 1) Why queering security is important with the rise of 
exclusionary far-right politics? 2) How and why focus on queer informed resistance as an 
expression of agency can benefit queered approach to security? 
Considering that LGBTQ individuals may be facing security problems not experienced 
by heteronormative cisgender citizens, the first set of measuring questions examine current 
security threats perceived by the LGBTQ community in Poland. Thus, this part puts primary 
emphasis on insecurity discourse and the main securitising actors as perceived by LGBTQ 
people. The analysis is based on the interviews from LGBTQ individuals and activists from 
Kraków. Face to face semi-structured interviews provided context-sensitive data on everyday 
experiences of (in)security of the interviewees. 
 
1) Why queering security is important with the rise of exclusionary far-right politics? 
• What are the main security threats perceived by the LGBTQ community in Poland? 
• Who are the key securitising actors? 
• How subjects of this study experience the narratives of the key securitising actors? 
 
Perceptions determine practices. Thus, the second part focuses on the strategies and 
mechanisms through which LGBTQ communities resist the (in)securitisation and try to make 
their voices heard. The thesis pays particular attention to the alternative ways of security 
articulation and rejects epistemological reliance on speech act as explicated in securitisation 
theory. It examines how LGBTQ people use practice (for example, demonstrations, protests) 
and visuals (images, memes, posters) to resist to institutionalised homophobia and make their 
voices heard. 
 
2) How and why focus on queer informed resistance as an expression of agency can 
benefit queered approach to security? 
• How LGBTQ persons resist to (in)securitisation? 
• What strategies and mechanisms do LGBTQ persons use to articulate their 
insecurities? 
• How non-heteronormative conception of resistance can help LGBTQ community’s 
voices be included in the security agenda? 
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By answering these questions, the thesis will be able to address the importance of queer 
informed conception of security, taking into account unique lived experiences of LGBTQ 
individuals under oppressive politics. This can be accomplished by focusing on the 
emancipatory and empowering potential of resistance, allowing marginal groups to have a say 
in inclusive security agenda. The study engages with experiences of (in)security and 
presupposes if LGBTQ community perceives (in)securitisation, more likely they will use 
alternative strategies of (in)security contestation, involving various configurations of visibility 
and invisibility.  
 
3.3 Methods 
The study draws on material gathered from fifteen semi-structured interviews with 
LGBTQ individuals who are also involved in some form of activism. The analysis is guided 
through the critical emancipatory lens. To complement the analysis, contextualise the situation 
and better understand the legal, political and social context, the study draws on publicly 
available information, including parliamentary debates, reports and other public documents 
related to LGBTQ people. The main emphasis is put on data from 2015-2020 (after far-right 
PiS party came to power), but a legal framework and social context is traced back from 
Poland’s EU accession talks from the late 90s. The analysis includes sources available in 
English as well as Polish. Secondary literature was used to crosscheck the data from various 
sources, which is particularly important when studying perceptions of marginal groups who 
may perceive evidence differently or have a bias to specific institutions. 
 
3.2.1 Primary Data Collection 
To understand the challenges faced by the LGBTQ community and inductively 
generate new insights into their ways of expression, fifteen semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with activists and representatives of the LGBTQ community. The 
study critically analyses how the interaction of participants and their ways of articulation of 
(in)security is situated in broader social and political discourse and power inequalities. 
The data was collected using flexible semi-structured interviews. This method gives 
power to respondents (Elliott and Timulak 2005) – who become co-researchers by interpreting 
phenomenon as they see it. Presented paper greatly benefited by a flexible approach, since 
many themes were brought into discussion by the participants. Face-to-face semi-structured 
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interviews maximise the quality of data collected and are widely used so solicit information on 
sensitive topics or with vulnerable groups. Presence of interviewer made it easier to build trust 
between the interviewer and researcher. In addition, respondents could clarify the answers or 
ask for clarification of questions. Semi-structured question list allowed the researcher to focus 
on key themes, but also to discuss topics introduced by the respondents. Usually, the main 
disadvantage of this method is concern over the privacy of the respondents. Confidentiality 
was ensured by removing all identifiers of the person and replacing the names with 
pseudonyms.  
Interviews were audio-recorded to make sure no important piece of information was 
missed. Interviews were conducted upon the respondent’s consent.  
 
3.2.2 Sampling Method 
Snowball sampling was used to recruit participants. Snowball sampling targets the 
hidden populations and is one of the best methods for recruiting hard-to-reach groups, ones 
who are less represented in the general population and for which the list of members is not 
available. Another advantage of this sampling method is that it may be faster and less 
expensive, mainly because the researcher was working in a foreign country.  
To recruit a respondent-driven sample, based on initial formative research, five key 
participants were recruited from the target population – LGBTQ activists in Kraków. These 
five initial participants – ‘seeds’ further helped to recruit ten more participants from their 
networks. Key participants are members or co-founders of LGBTQ NGOs in Kraków. They 
were given information regarding the research and contact details of the researcher to distribute 
within their networks. Some respondents were recruited through online LGBTQ community 
networks with the help of NGOs and LGBTQ friendly spaces (Tęczuj, DOM EQ – Krakówskie 
Centrum Równości, LGBTQ choir Krakofonia) based in Kraków. This method had several 
limitations: data can be biased towards socially better connected and may leave out socially 
isolated LGBTQ people. 
Overall, fifteen LGBTQ people were recruited who are also involved in some form of 
activism. Their age ranged between 19-31. Fourteen of them are Polish students or young 
people currently working or studying in Kraków. The fieldwork research was conducted in a 
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timeframe between February-March 202010, in Kraków, at safe locations, mainly in a room 
booked at the Jagiellonian University. One interview was conducted via skype. 
 
3.2.3 Data Analysis 
The data was analysed using qualitative content analysis combining conventional and 
directed approaches. Key themes ((in)security and resistance) were preconceived and derived 
from the theoretical framework (see Figure 1). Deductive use of theory helped focus on 
research questions (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999). Two main themes relating to the 
main concepts of this study: security and resistance helped to determine initial themes based 
on semi-structured interview questions. However, when deriving codes and categories, the 
study mainly took the interpretive inductive approach to data analysis and no preconceived 
categories within these themes were identified before coding. The research allowed the codes 
and new insights to emerge from the data. The thesis aimed to get direct information from the 
study participants, putting their perspectives at the centre of inquiry. Therefore, deductive 
application of central concepts of the study combined with inductive code generation from the 
data allowed the study to avoid shortcomings of conventional content analysis and contributed 
towards analysis more grounded into theory. 
 
 
10 Initially twenty interviews were planned, but the fieldwork was disrupted by unravelling COVID–19 and 
imposed lockdown in Poland 
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Figure 1: Data Analysis: Themes and Sub-Themes 
 
3.4 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations including safety, rights of the research participants and data 
protection are priorities in this research. The research received approval from Glasgow 
University Ethics Commission. No pressing safety issues corresponded the research, apart from 
emotional distress that could have been caused by talking on sensitive issues for the 
participants. To minimise the distress, the researcher ensured that she was familiar with the full 
spectrum of gender identities and issues affecting this group. Particular attention was paid to 
the body language of the researcher. The relatively informal tone of the interview was used to 
make respondents feel comfortable. Interviewer ensured that she spoke clearly, used proper 
grammar, gender pronouns and not overly formal language. 
Before the interview, all participants received Plain Language Statement (Appendix B) 
explaining why the research was done and what it would involve. The form also included 
information that participant was free to withdraw at any time. After getting familiar with 







































To ensure the confidentiality of the participants, all possible identifiers were removed 
from the data and were replaced by a pseudonym. In the paper, they are referred to by the 
pseudonyms. At the end of the research project, all personal data will be destroyed, including 
audio recordings and transcripts. Witten summary of results as well as the final paper has been 


























4. Security Under Insecurity: Exploring LGBTQ 
(in)Security Discourse in Poland 
Due to the research rationale, the study did not provide a fixed conceptualisation of 
security and left its meaning to emerge from the interview data. This being the case, before 
moving to further analysis, the thesis examines how security is perceived and experienced by 
the subjects of this study – LGBTQ individuals living in Poland. Various security problems 
that the respondents discussed stand very close to the human security framework. 
Consequently, instead of providing new conceptualisation for the queered security analysis, 
based on the data gathered from the interviews focusing on respondents’ feelings of every day 
(in)securities, the study draws on the concept of security from human security framework 
(UNDP 1994). 
The concept of human security broadens the scope of security analysis and puts forward 
the security of people (UNDP 1994). Thus, it is a people-centred approach ‘concerned with 
how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how 
much access they have to market and social opportunities (1994: 23). One of the ways to 
conceptualise queer security under the human security framework is to name the threats that it 
must address (Alkire 2003 :24). UNDP 1994 report established seven dimensions of human 
security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, political. At least five 
of those dimensions: economic, health, personal, community and political are relevant for 
queering (in)security.  
 
4.1 Queered (in)Security in Poland 
The idea to take human security as an analytical framework emerged after preliminary 
data analysis and was used for categorisation of the codes on the second stage. The table 
below represents the relationship and categorisation of seven dimensions of human security 
within three key components of the human security concept: freedom from fear, freedom 
from want and life in dignity (UNDP 1994). Here, it is suggested to include Life in Dignity as 
a critical component comprised of different types of security. The table further shows how 
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Discrimination at the workplace, 
lack of legal protections 
Food Security Hunger, famine, 
malnutrition 
 
Health Security Lack of access to 
healthcare, Infectious 
diseases 
Barriers to healthcare, adverse 
effects of disclosure, the 
unfamiliarity of doctors to LGB 

















Personal Security Crime, physical 
violence, abuse 
Physical and verbal violence, 









Political Security Violations of human 




Violations of human rights and 
civil liberties, political 
repression, unlawful treatment 
Figure 2: Author’s elaboration based on the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994  
 
The table illustrates that the human security framework relates to LGBTQ peoples’ 
security problems in at least five aspects. First, human security relates to the protection of an 
individuals’ personal safety. This means freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence 
(personal security). Equal rights and political protection are included under political security. 
Many respondents (eleven out of fifteen) interviewed in this study, expressed concern that they 
feel like second-rate citizens due to their limited rights. LGBTQ people’s political security is 
also undermined by a violation of fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly. Third, LGBTQ people often face discrimination at the workplace 
(economic security). Legal protection at the workplace is not always translated into practical 
actions of enforcement. Fourth, regarding health security, LGBTQ people face barriers to 
access to healthcare (Meyer and Northridge 2007). Many doctors are not familiar with lesbian, 
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gay, and bisexual individuals’ health needs, especially with transgender health needs (Shukla 
et al. 2014). Before moving to further analysis, it has to be mentioned, that community security 
– defined as identity-based discrimination, is not discussed in separate subchapter, because all 
discriminations in political, economic, health and personal security domain faced by LGBTQ 
community, by definition, are discussed on the grounds of their sexual and gender identity. 
Thus, they already refer to community security as defined by UNDP. Human security serves 
as an analytical frame derived from the data and is used to categorise LGBTQ (in)security into 
four subchapters. Next sections analyse narratives of the respondents focusing on political, 
personal, economic and health (in)security. 
 
4.1.1 Political (in)Security of Queer Individuals in Poland 
Political insecurity that includes violations of human rights and civil liberties, political 
repression and unlawful treatment is prevalent for LGBTQ individuals living in Poland (see 
Godzisz and Knut 2019; IGLA 2020). Political security is closely related to community, 
economic, health and personal insecurities. Some authors (Buzan et al. 1998) even argue that 
all security is political. Thus, it is one of the broadest sectors. Keeping that in mind, for 
analytical convenience, under this sector paper addresses only lack of protections and legal 
rights on the grounds of sexual or gender identity. 
Majority of the respondents believe that they do not enjoy the same rights as 
heterosexual, cisgender citizens and that they are invisible to the government. Basia underlines 
invisibility of LGBTQ people as individuals worthy of protection: ‘we are not seen as the 
people; we are just an ideology’. ‘The government is made of people who are very vocal about 
protecting the traditional family from the deprivation of the, you know, immoral LGBTQ 
people’– commented Elena and repeated the same line – ‘am not a person, I’m an ideology’. 
The majority of respondents (Basia, Augusta, Jakub, Ania, Filip, Zofia, Kuba, Andrzej) believe 
that the government does not see them as individuals who need protection, they are de-
humanised as ‘imported’ ideologies who threaten Polish values. As a result, they are excluded 
from the security agenda. 
Respondents feelings (Basia, Jakub, Andrzej, Elena, Dagmara) that they are treated as 
second-rate citizens is supported by the evidence. ILGA Annual Review of the Human Rights 
Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People (2020) marks Poland as the 
worst state in the European Union in regard to LGBTQ rights. One of the most explicit 
violations of the rights of LGBTQ individuals is a declaration of ‘LGBT-free zones’ by more 
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than 80 municipalities across Poland. Even though anti-LGBTQ resolutions are not binding, 
they make LGBTQ populations feel unwelcome and threatened in their own country. 
Majority of the respondents (thirteen out of fifteen) also emphasised the lack of legal 
protections. Reflecting on their predicament, most of them mentioned that institutionalised 
homophobia forces LGBTQ people to move out of Poland. As Iwona said, it forces them – 
‘just to go somewhere where the law can protect you’. All respondents observed that the Polish 
government completely ignores their problems. According to Piotr: ‘they don’t see the 
problem, and when you don’t see the problem, there is no problem’. Indeed, there are no special 
protections for LGBTQ individuals in the Polish constitution. Only Polish Labour Code (Art. 
113) contains sexual orientation as the ground of discrimination and outside the employment 
there are no special legal protections in access to social protection, goods and services, 
including housing, healthcare and education (Bojarski 2016: 6). 
Apart from the legal protection from hate crimes and discrimination, the legal 
partnership was one of the most desired rights mentioned by the respondents. Poland is one of 
six EU countries – alongside Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania — which does 
not recognise any form of legalised same-sex relationship, neither marriage nor minimal Civic 
Partnership (IGLA 2020, Equaldex.com 2020). Same-sex parents have no right to joint 
adoption or second-parent adoption (Equaldex.com 2020). Defending her right to legal 
partnership and marriage, Elena said:  
 
I am not abnormal. I love whom I love, and there is nothing more natural than love. I 
want to have legal, you know, legally recognised wedding […]. We’re citizens like the 
other people; we pay the same taxes, we have to abide by the same laws, we have the 
same duties, we should have the same rights as you. 
 
Ada also thinks that legal partnership would make their life ‘so much easier’. Another 
desired right was a right to child adoption for same-sex partners. According to Ada, if the 
government was tolerant and granted her the right, she would have a child: ‘a lot of worst 
people on the earth have kids, so why not me? Because I am homosexual? It is not a problem’. 
Overall, all of the respondents mentioned that for achieving political rights and legal 
protections, visibility of the problem was crucial. According to them, the lack of access to the 
articulation of their problems poses significant constraints to LGBTQ activists’ fighting for 
security. Among the members of the LGBTQ community, there is the perception that they are 
not seen as people worthy of protection. Thus, their political security is severely undermined 
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by the declaration of LGBT-Free zones, unequal treatment from the government, lack of legal 
protections and rights. While protection from hate crimes and discrimination relate to ‘freedom 
from fear’, legal partnerships and child adoption rights can be included under ‘freedom from 
want’ component of the human security framework. 
 
4.1.2 Personal (in)security: ‘Passing’ and Acting Straight 
Institutionalised homophobia has real-life consequences on the safety and security of 
LGBTQ people. Personal security was one of the biggest concerns mentioned by the 
respondents. According to the majority of them (ten out of fifteen), the most significant 
consequence of the government’s hostile rhetoric is the normalisation of violence towards 
them. All fifteen respondents mentioned that they had experienced physical or verbal violence 
on the grounds of their sexual or gender identity at some point in their lives. One respondent 
observed that they do not experience immediate physical threat, but ‘you still feel 
uncomfortable…like not in danger, but not safe’ (Adam). Thus, security, understood as one’s 
feeling of safety, is severely undermined despite the absence of immediate physical threat.  
All respondents asserted that the ruling Law and Justice party normalises and facilitates 
hate speech, discrimination and violence against LGBTQ people. Augusta, an online activist, 
believes that the government is not holding accountable the individuals and groups who 
threaten LGBTQ people. According to Jakub: – ‘Białystok March is the biggest consequence, 
the terrorists from Lublin March, the whole increase of violence towards LGBT+ people, it is 
thanks to them.’  
Most of the respondents mentioned Białystok March (ten out of fourteen) as a milestone 
event for Polish LGBTQ community, where dozens of LGBTQ marchers got physically 
assaulted by counter-protesters. According to them, this event was one of the most evident 
reminders that LGBTQ people were not safe in Poland. ‘It was like a gay hunting…people 
were beaten in the street, and they were scared, crying’– recalled Dagmara. ‘Bialystok March 
showed us that if we won’t help ourselves, we won’t get any help from the government’– 
observed Jakub. 
In a climate of insecurity, hiding once’s queerness is a price for physical security. Some 
respondents prefer to avoid ‘too much visibility’. Member of LGBTQ choir said that they try 
not to be very visible for security reasons: ‘we intentionally keep it low profile, don’t advertise 
in spaces that would get us potentially bullied or harmed or anything’ (Elena). Holding hands 
in public or displaying affection is also considered as a brave move. Elena said that she is 
especially scared when she sees queer people displaying affection in public: – ‘my heart skips 
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a bit, on my god, do they feel safe enough, is it safe? And I stay to be a witness if something 
happens’. Narratives of the respondents reinforce Lene Hansen’s argument that security is 
profoundly gendered and is contingent on conformity with gendered social norms (Hansen 
2000). That is why many LGBTQ individuals are forced to remain in the closet. 
Personal security and resistance via visibility are directly connected. Some LGBTQ 
individuals refuse to ‘discipline their bodies’ and sometimes for them, visibility comes as a 
personal sacrifice. Two respondents said that they are ready to sacrifice their physical security 
for the long-term benefits for the community. Piotr asserted, that if he encounters someone 
being openly homophobic, he would not mind getting abused physically, so that the person 
who uses violence against him, faces the consequences: – ‘Okay, I will go to the hospital for 
few days, but they will go to prison for few months’. Jakub, a transgender man, also made the 
same point: – ‘whatever, I will get beaten up in the street, and that’s all. If it is the price of a 
better future, why not?’.  
Not surprisingly, not everyone is ready to sacrifice their physical safety for visibility. 
Everyday concerns about physical security push many LGBTQ people into the closet and 
significantly limit their ability to counter (in)securitisation openly. As, Elena, a member of the 
LGBTQ choir, observed, their activism is only limited to ‘just performing’ for security reasons. 
Choices between immediate physical security and resistance to (in)securitisation are 
profoundly shaped by the current political climate that poses a security dilemma for LGBTQ 
individuals: either to be invisible and safe as a physical body or openly resist and face the 
consequences. 
 
4.1.3 Economic (in)security 
Even though there are legal protections for LGBTQ people in the Polish Labour Code 
(mainly because of the EU law transposed into Polish law or directly applied), several 
respondents (Ada, Jakub, Andrzej) expressed concern that they do not feel job security, because 
the government is not on their side. For Ada, the only way to keep her job is to remain in a 
closet:  
 
In my workplace, everyone talks about their private lives, but I don’t talk about my 
private life, because I am worried that I can be fired… Even though there are legal 
protections that they cannot fire you based on your sexuality, they can just come up 
with whatever […]. And with this kind of government, I couldn’t do anything with this. 
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Another respondent, Jan, also made the same point, that sometimes it is just the pressure 
that makes queer people quit the job. He said that it is not as simple as your boss just firing you 
because you are gay, but: 
 
 There are many different social mechanisms which may result in quitting the job. So, 
it is more like the fear of what other people would think, than losing that job per se […] 
Your colleagues may turn your job into a nightmare, and you can do nothing about it. 
 
Ada also mentioned that for her and her partner taking a bank credit and buying a house 
together would be very difficult and in the case of a break-up, only one partner would get the 
ownership. According to her, legal partnerships could solve this problem and give LGBTQ 
couples better access to services and economic well-being. 
The interviewees’ perceptions of economic (in)security are also supported by the 
research data. Even though in Poland employment is the only area where LGBTQ individuals 
are legally protected against discrimination, according to the research conducted by NGOs 
(Godzisz and Knut 2018) employees rarely take legal action against their employer on the 
grounds of discrimination. There can be several factors for that, including the fear, lack of trust 
in law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. Consequently, the only legal protection 
‘guaranteed’ for LGBTQ individuals is not always translated into practice, severely 
undermining their economic and job security. 
 
4.1.4 Health (in)security 
Health Security is another crucial aspect of structural violence against the LGBTQ 
community. Structural violence understood as avoidable impairment of human life and 
fundamental human needs (Galtung 1969), can not only deprive LGBTQ people of their basic 
needs but also lead to premature death and disability (Farmer et al. 2006). LGBTQ issues are 
absent in Poland’s national health plans, suicide prevention programs and health surveys 
(Godzisz and Knut 2018 :5).  
In the presented study, health insecurity was mainly emphasised by transgender 
individuals (Jakub, Filip, Alix, Kuba), who underlined that their specific problems are almost 
entirely ignored not only by the government and health sector but also by mainstream LGBTQ 
movement, mainly advocating gay and to a lesser extent, lesbian rights. Jakub underlined that 
in general, transgender population is the most invisible part of the LGBTQ community and that 
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double indivisibility creates more problems for trans people in access to services (see also 
Zucker and Lawrence 2009; Fassinger and Arseneau 2007; Worthen 2013). 
Filip, who is undergoing hormonal therapy, said that he feels the most discriminated 
and humiliated when he needs to get medical care. Kuba talked about the difficulties of the 
sexual transition process in Poland. To undergo a full transition process, including 
hysterectomy, first, the person needs to change their legal gender that in Poland sometimes can 
take years. He mentioned that a person who wants to improve their legal gender needs to pursue 
a lawsuit against their parents, ‘accusing’ them of wrongly assigning gender to their child. 
Kuba, who has foster parents, finds it extremely difficult to get a favourable ruling in the court. 
Consequently, he is not able to complete the transition. He said that taking testosterone for a 
long time without full transition, can cause cancer in different parts of his body, but he still has 
to wait for the court’s ruling. 
The scientific literature and statistical data also back up Kuba’s and Filip’s concerns 
that the transgender population is significantly underserved in mental health and medical 
services in Poland (see Brabski and Dora 2019; Świder and Winiewski 2017). In Poland no 
gender-dedicated clinics exist, few sexual medicine specialists work in this field, and only a 
few psychiatrists, psychologists and endocrinologists are familiar with the treatment and 
assessment (Brabski and Dora 2019). State health insurance does not cover the individual needs 
of LGBTQ people, there is a lack of services and expertise on trans issues, and LGBTQ people 
are discriminated in access to healthcare (Godzisz and Knut 2019). In Poland, changing legal 
gender is a very complicated procedure, and there are no comprehensive legal regulations 
concerning legal transition. In one research (Świder and Winiewski 2017) when asked about 
their experiences 28 per cent of transgender individuals declared that they experienced 
discrimination from the healthcare professionals and about 72 per cent of them admitted 
considering suicide during the last year.  
Other respondents also mentioned prejudice and lack of awareness of LGBTQ issues 
in Polish medical sector (Basia, Ania, Andrzej). Another most frequently voiced problem was 
lack of mental health services for LGBTQ people. Basia thinks that one of the biggest problems 
for queer individuals is the negative consequences of homophobia on their mental health. She 
also mentioned that mental health is not a priority of the government in general: – ‘our country 
does not provide proper care for mental illnesses not only for LGBT people but for anyone’. 
She recalled her own experience when her therapist from the state-sponsored program was 
homophobic, so now, she has to pay much more for her mental health therapies at the private 
clinic.  
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Interview data indicate that invisibility and lack of awareness of the unique needs of 
LGBTQ populations result in discriminatory access to healthcare and undermines their health 
security, perpetuating structural violence against them. The transgender population seems to 
be the most vulnerable in this regard. To summarise, the LGBTQ individuals interviewed in 
this study emphasise on lack of access to healthcare services based on their special needs, 
absence of gender-specific clinics and mental health programs, discriminatory practices of 
health professionals and in general, absence of LGBTQ issues from the Polish healthcare sector 
and government-funded health plans. 
 
5.1.5 Instead of the Subchapter summary: Provenance and (In)security 
The previous chapter examined various security problems of queer individuals. It used 
human security as an analytical frame to discuss political, personal, economic and health 
security problems that LGBTQ populations face in Poland. It found that subjects of this study 
are facing violations of human rights and civil liberties, repression, physical and verbal 
violence, hate crime, job insecurity and barriers to access to healthcare. 
Interestingly, the data gathered through the interviewees’ narratives indicate that the 
place of residence influences the perceptions of (in)security. On the question, what it was like 
to be an LGBTQ person in Poland, all fifteen respondents observed that it largely depends on 
where one lives. Ada, who comes from a small town in Lesser Poland (Małopolska) and now 
lives in Kraków, said that ‘it is two different worlds.’ She feels safer in Kraków because the 
big city gives her a feeling of anonymity and she can hold hands with her partner, something 
that would have been impossible in her hometown. Iwona made the same point: 
 
I think it just depends from place to place. Personally, I moved from a small town 
around Kraków. Because, I’m not sure there are any gay people in my hometown and 
if there are, they probably hide it, or they don’t enter in same-sex relationships. [after 
moving to Kraków] I acknowledged that, at least, I have the chance to be myself more, 
than I would have had this chance in my hometown. 
 
Atlas of Hate (atlasnienawisci.pl) created by Polish activists that delineates ‘LGBT-
free’ zones, shows that municipal and local governments declaring themselves free of ‘LGBT 
ideology’ are mainly located in the South-Eastern part of Poland. This region is one of the less 
economically advanced voivodship in Poland, with the high unemployment rate (European 
Commission-Regional Innovation Monitor Plus) and high support for the PiS party (Bublewicz 
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2020). Several respondents underlined the widespread anti-LGBT sentiments in this part of 
Poland. Some of them explain this by the fact that this region is ‘more Catholic’ (Augusta, 
Maja, Andrzej). ‘It’s even worse [in the Eastern part of Poland] because the Church is even 
stronger there and people have more traditional mindset’– observed Maja. 
The interviewees’ narratives show that security and insecurity, subjective or objective 
varies from place to place. Therefore, all four aspects of security discussed earlier also depend 
on the locations. The study found that many LGBTQ individuals experience problems in access 
to quality healthcare; they experience the lack of economic security, political rights and 
protection, as well as threats to their physical safety. At the same time, these insecurities are 
unequally distributed across different parts of Poland, municipalities, cities and even villages, 
underlining an important limitation of this study.  
The research data is also in line with Lene Hansen’s (2000: 285) argument that security 
as a practice is profoundly gendered, and those who are constrained in their ability to access 
the dominant discourse are prevented from becoming subjects of security worthy of 
consideration and protection. Marginalised status, institutionalised homophobia and refusal of 
the state to protect LGBTQ individuals, endanger them and limits their ability to fight for 
security. Thus, the LGBTQ community’s invisibility in political, personal, economic and 
health security sectors, undermine their right to live in dignity, free from fear and free from 
want. Keeping these important implications in mind, it is crucial to address who creates and 
shapes LGBTQ (in)security discourse. The next section focuses on key (in)securitising actors 
and their narratives based on perceptions of the subjects of this study. 
 
4.2 Key Actors in LGBTQ (in)Security Discourse 
The previous chapter addressed the main security concerns of the LGBTQ community. 
To better understand how (in)security is created and exercised, it is important to name the main 
actors are who shape and influence queer (in)security and in turn, against whom and what 
narratives LGBTQ individuals resist. This section analyses the narratives of the actors 
operating in LGBTQ security discourse as perceived by the subjects of this study.  
The interview data indicate that main securitising actors in LGBTQ discourse are the 
ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), Polish Roman Catholic Church and Public Service Media 
(PSM), from 2016 also referred to as National Media.11 All respondents had negative 
 
11 As a result of legislative changes introduced with the Law of 22 June 2016 on the National Media Council, 
ruling Law and Justice party has changed the same the name into ‘National Media’. For more information visit: 
https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Publications/Reports/Poland–Independence–of–Public–Service–Media 
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perceptions of these three actors. Majority of the respondents’ (thirteen out of fifteen) opinions 
are in line with Augusta, agreeing that the lack of acceptance of LGBTQ community is ‘a 
mutual fault of the church and the current ruling party’. Categorising media as a securitising 
actor or a functional actor is challenging since it mainly reflects the ruling party’s homophobic 
narratives. Thus, considering media as the securitising or functional actor is arbitrary and is 
based entirely on the respondents’ perceptions.  
Functional actors can affect the dynamics of the security sector by enforcing or 
facilitating (in)securitisation, but they are not the ones who make the securitising move – they 
do not declare what needs to be seen as a threat (Buzan et al. 1998 :36). Based on the 
respondents’ narratives, three main functional actors were identified: opposition parties, police 
and judiciary.  
  
Securitising Actors 
Government (PiS party) 
Polish Roman Catholic Church 
Media 
National media  
Functional Actors 








Figure 3: Categorisation of actors in the Polish LGBTQ security discourse perceived by the 
respondents  
 
Opinions on commercial media, opposition, police and judiciary were somewhat 
mixed. If the absolute majority of the interviewed say that the current government is doing 
nothing to protect LGBTQ individuals, they have a somewhat neutral view on the police and 
judiciary as their protectors. However, none of them said they would go to the police or to the 
court in the case of verbal abuse and that they would only do so in the case of physical violence. 
One respondent, Piotr, thinks that on the lower level, police and individual judges, may be 
willing to help, but when it goes to the Prosecutor’s office, it may get complicated since the 
government controls it. Regarding protection at the equality Pride Marches, majority of the 
respondents (except for Ada and Jan) noted that police’s presence is the main guarantee of their 
safety.  
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Regarding opposition parties, interviewees noted that they do not feel much support 
from them. However, all respondents mentioned the party called Spring (Wiosna) led by the 
openly gay former mayor of Słupsk, Robert Biedroń. One of the core issues of the party 
ideology revolves around gender equality (Program of the Party – wiosnabiedronia.pl). As 
Augusta observed, even though Spring in coalition with two other leftist parties won seats in 
2019 parliamentary elections, it does not make much difference for LGBTQ community 
because ‘it is always the two conservative parties that fight against each other, and this is PiS 
and PO’. Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) is the most prominent opposition centre-
right party; but as Jakub and Jan observed, LGBTQ issues are usually ignored in their 
programs. However, Jakub said, presidential elections of 2020 could have been a chance for a 
change since openly gay candidate Robert Biedroń was running for a president and a candidate 
from Civic Platform also tackled possibility of civil partnership for LGBTQ people. Although, 
as Dagmara notes, the opposition is either not fully committed, or even if it was, ‘they do not 
have anything to say, because the government, the ruling party [PiS] is in a big majority’.  
This section briefly summarised respondents’ perceptions of key securitising and 
functional actors in Polish queer (in)security discourse. The next two sub-sections draw on 
perceptions of LGBTQ people and activists to analyse how key securitising actors: the 
government (PiS Party), Polish Catholic Church and the National Media shape and construct 
queer insecurity discourse.  
 
4.2.1 The Law and Justice Party’s Discourse – ‘Not quite Pole’: Sense of 
Belonging In The Narratives of The LGBTQ People. 
All of the respondents referred to the ruling PiS party as one of the key actors shaping 
their insecurity discourse. The feeling of isolation, marginalisation and ‘otherness’ as a 
consequence of politicians’ anti-LGBTQ narratives vividly emerged from the data. The 
interviewees (Jakub, Piotr, Iwona) think that even though the ruling party is limited in passing 
and implementing openly anti-LGBTQ policies because of membership in the EU, the most 
damage is done by their homophobic rhetoric and letting ‘slide fascist ideology’ (Adam). Adam 
observed that they are the most worried about the emergence of violent ideologies and groups 
that the government allows and normalises; ‘That is a real threat, in my opinion’– they 
concluded. Exclusion of LGBTQ individuals from nationalist discourses has real-life 
consequences on their everyday security. Marginalisation and discrimination of LGBTQ 
population not only strengthen their feeling of alienation from the nation but also undermine 
their political, economic, health and personal security. 
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In the interview, vice-president of the LGBTQ organisation (Iwona), observed that 
many LGBTQ people question their national identity as a consequence of government’s 
homophobic rhetoric. She thinks that one of the immense consequences of institutionalised 
homophobia is that LGBTQ people feel that they are not welcome in their own country, – ‘that 
we are not treated as hundred per cent citizens, or Poles’. She observed, that LGBTQ people 
in Poland were bombarded by homophobia and lack of acceptance from so many sites, that it 
made them scared for their friends, their partners and themselves.  
Transgender man, Jakub, also underlined that the basic rhetoric of the Polish 
government is that ‘we are a threat to Poland, sin from West and we didn’t exist until the 90s’. 
‘They consider us to be foreign agents, we’re not real Poles, we are spies or agents, paid by 
foreign entities, so we are traitors’, said Elena, a member of an LGBTQ Choir from Kraków.  
The social and political construction of (in)security constructs winners and losers of 
security practices (Bigo 2014). While allegedly protecting the Polish nation, state and identity 
from ‘LGBT ideology’, the ruling party (in)securities the LGBTQ community. According to 
several respondents (Elena, Augusta, Andrzej) in Polish conservative society, the PiS party 
presents the LGBTQ community as a threat in order to make appealing populist claims for 
conservative and religious voters. They also noted, that during previous elections the ruling 
party presented refugees as public enemies and now it was the LGBTQ community; – ‘They 
have a history of basically dog-whistling every minority towards during the election times […] 
it has always been their strategy’– said Adam. ‘In the election campaign in 2015, the scapegoat, 
the black sheep, to be blamed for just about everything, where the refugees, and after that 
LGBTQ community took that position’ – Elena repeated the same line.  
To sum up, data indicates that the ruling Law and Justice party is seen as one of the 
main actors shaping LGBTQ individuals’ insecurity. Exclusion from nationalist project and 
state’s refusal to accept LGBTQ populations undermines their security in various fields as 
discussed previously. Next chapter examines how LGBTQ individuals perceive the role of the 
Church in their experiences of homophobia and feeling of insecurity. 
 
4.2.2 The Catholic Church as Securitising Actor 
All respondents consider the Polish Catholic Church as one of the primary sources 
(in)securitisation, together with the ruling PiS party. They underlined that the Church plays a 
negative role in shaping homophobic attitudes to the LGBTQ community, that in turn, has 
severe real-life consequences on their safety and security. 
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Some respondents (Jan, Kuba, Dagmara) believe that the Church plays a more 
important role in presenting the LGBTQ community as a threat than the government. ‘They 
[the Church] have so much power in Poland; they have more power than politicians and 
politicians listen to them because they think that Polish people listen to them’– said Basia. Maja 
also illustrated this point: 
 
There is a lot of influence of the Catholic Church here, but it’s not a good influence like 
we should expect from the Christians. It’s very hateful influence. The only model of 
the family is man, cis man and cis woman having babies and everything outside in this 
model should not be tolerated […] including women who are not in a relationship, any 
kind or LGBTQ community or people who do not want to have kids. It’s one and the 
only model available.  
 
Maja also asked a rhetorical question regarding the role of religion in Polish national 
identity: – ‘I wonder where is Polishness so linked with Catholicism? Or it’s just a fake link. 
When we separate Catholicism from Polishness what would stay? I mean, I’m not even sure’. 
Elena also underlined, that the main problem the Church being above the law and facing no 
consequences for their hateful rhetoric.  
Several respondents (Kuba, Elena, Ada, Piotr) observed that the Church’s homophobia 
has a significant role in marginalising and deteriorating well-being and of LGBTQ individuals 
because many of them are raised in Catholic families, following Catholic traditions. They 
mentioned the quote by the Metropolitan Archbishop of Kraków, who called LGBTQ 
movement a ‘rainbow plague’ (Chadwick 2019). Basia thinks one of the most severe results of 
the homophobia from the Church is mental-health problems experienced by many of them. 
Jakub sadly noted, that there is ‘narration from politics, narration from the Church, narration 
from your parents, from your family, from television, from media that you’re living a sin, you 
are sick, you have to go to the doctor, to get help and stop being sick’. He even recalled an 
extreme case when a transgender individual was ‘exorcised’ for being transgender ‘because a 
demon supposedly possessed them according to some priests and very religious parents’. Kuba 
mentioned a quite comic moment when one priest during the religious mass, preached that 
Coronavirus was brought by ‘homosexuals and people who accept homosexual people and 
LGBTQ community.’ 
Augusta thinks that for Polish Catholic Church homophobia is a way to keep power. 
She thinks that the LGBTQ community is regarded as enemies, in order to focus masses 
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attention on something terrible and threatening that requires united action: – ‘this is such 
powerful rhetoric for everybody who wants to keep power. Like to point to something bad, and 
you have to defend yourself against it’.  
To summarise, the data indicates, that since many Polish LGBTQ people are raised in 
Catholic families, and some of them identify themselves as followers of Catholicism, 
homophobic narratives coming from religious figures have serious negative consequences of 
their feelings of belonging, faith and mental well-being. Moreover, as Basia believes, if the 
Church was not playing so much role in the negative portrayal of LGBTQ community, ‘polish 
people would have been so much liberal to the LGBT’. The respondents also believe that the 
Church’s open homophobia in tandem with the ruling party facilitates violence towards them. 
According to the interviewees, the ruling Law and Justice party and the Polish Roman Catholic 
Church are not the only actors who (in)securitise them. Next section explores perceptions of 
LGBTQ individuals on the role of National Media as another securitising actor. 
 
4.2.3 Media and (in)Securitizing Discourse 
The absolute majority of the respondents (fourteen out of fifteen) underlined that the 
Public Service Media (National Media) also plays a significant role in (in)securitisation of 
LGBTQ people, portraying them as threats to the Polish society and children. All respondents 
of the study expressed sharp criticism of Polish public broadcaster – Telewizja Polska (TVP). 
Majority of the respondents when discussing media referred to the National TV, therefore 
analysis mainly includes respondents’ opinions to television channels.  
Transgender man, Filip, spoke about lack of unbiased information on the LGBTQ 
community as a result of their selective visibility in media. He said that the primary way for 
most of the people to get information about LGBTQ people is through the National Media, 
which is hugely biased. Filip thinks that people like him are misunderstood or not seen at all. 
He ironically observed, the name of the public broadcaster should change its name to ‘TV of 
PiS’: – ‘because it’s really very visible that they’re speaking on their side all the time’. Many 
respondents mentioned how TVP tends to twist information and spreads disinformation to 
increase homophobic sentiments. Iwona noted that once TVP took material from Pride March 
in Germany and claimed it was happening in Poland: – ‘so it’s not like teenagers in Poland 
celebrating being gay and being open, but it was people in fetish gear or something’. Reporters 
Without Borders (RSF 2020) report has also emphasised governmental bias and significant 
decline in the press freedom in Poland. According to the report (RSF 2020), in Poland, state-
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owned media has been transformed into government propaganda outlets where hate speech and 
partisan discourse are the rules. 
The majority of the respondents’ (Basia, Jakub, Iwona, Filip, Jan, Dagmara, Maja, 
Elena, Piotr, Andrzej) opinions were in line with online activist Augusta, who said that the 
National TV stations were tools of propaganda under current ruling Law and Justice Party. 
Then she recalled a documentary on one of the national TV channels about the LGBTQ 
community called ‘rainbow plague’, ‘rainbow disease’. Another respondent, Jan, summarised 
media narrative on LGBTQ community, saying that Polish National Media is very openly 
homophobic: ‘[they] openly say that LGBT people are bad, they’re monsters, they’re a disease, 
they’re heading to kidnap your kids, we will rape their kids’. 
Apart from biased anti-LGBTQ documentaries and information, according to the 
interviewees, national TV also gives a platform to people who spread hateful propaganda. Maja 
recalled the case when a bishop who called LGBTQ community a plague was invited in a TV 
show to address society openly. She also thinks, since the Church is very visible in media, they 
have more significant leverage in shaping people’s homophobic attitudes.  
Several respondents (Jakub, Piotr, Iwona, Andrzej) expressed concern that many people 
in Poland get information primarily from the TV and in many parts of Poland, only national 
TV channels are translated. Jakub noted, that people who do not have access to the internet or 
those who just do not check the news on the internet, are solely influenced by the Polish 
National TV. Many respondents believe, more positive media coverage would help them a lot 
to counter homophobia. According to Piotr, the problem is not only anti-LGBTQ propaganda 
on national TV, but also people’s unwillingness to use alternative sources. In the end, even 
though there are alternatives, Andrzej and Piotr are confident, that for a large segment of 
society anti-LGBTQ biased Public Service Media remain the main sources of information.  
 
4.2.4 Chapter Summary 
The previous sections examined perceptions and experiences of political, personal, 
health and economic (in)securities of the LGBTQ community in Poland and emphasised on 
security problems of individuals who do not fit into state-sanctioned notions of identity. After 
mapping queer (in)security discourse, the paper analysed key securitising actors as perceived 
by the respondents of this study – the ruling Law and Justice Party, Polish Roman Catholic 
Church and the National Service Media, also referred as the National Media. The chapter 
showed the importance of queering security because the dominant security paradigm in Poland 
is queer-blind and does not acknowledge security problems that LGBTQ individuals 
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experience in their everyday lives. The crucial aspect in developing inclusive security agenda, 
that would shield securitised subjects from oppressive politics, is to empower their agency. 
Underpinning the emancipatory potential of resistance, next chapter analyses how under the 
climate of insecurity the LGBTQ community employs various tactics and practises of 

































5. Queer Security Dilemma: Resistance and Politics of 
(in)Visibility 
Resistance is the second key concept in this study. The presented paper adopts a broad 
understanding of resistance and examines individual and collective practices used by queer 
individuals to contest their (in)security and resist to the securitising actors’ homophobia. The 
most important finding regarding the role and possibilities of resistance in queer (in)security 
discourse that emerged from the data was a clear need to extend understanding of resistance 
from open, visible and collective strategies to more hidden, personalised and invisible forms 
of resistance. Expansion of the focus to more hidden ways of security contestation was dictated 
by acknowledging what the author calls here a ‘queer security dilemma’– a condition when a 
choice of visibility aimed at getting more security, can threaten one’s physical safety. This 
dilemma also impacts the choices and strategies of resistance. For that reason, in the presented 
study, understanding of resistance is informed by James Scott’s insights on the multifaced 
nature of the struggle of marginal groups against the dominant paradigm, focusing on various 
public and private acts of resistance.  
The major issue that arises with shifting the focus to hidden, personalised and invisible 
resistance(s) is the difficulty in measuring the outcome/effect. However, the very 
epistemological standpoint that the study takes is not directed towards easily observed 
outcomes ‘out there’ found in broader public, political and social discourses. Instead, the thesis 
calls for a genuine bottom-up approach to find missing queer voices and resistance(s) that 
impact the consequences of (in)securitisation through their limited agency.  
As mentioned earlier, ‘security as silence’– occurs when making a problem visible by 
marginal groups may be impossible or even aggravate the threat (Hansen 2000 :287). The 
following extract from the interview illustrates this point: – ‘for a very long time I tried not to 
be visible because I didn’t want to get a blue eye’ (Dagmara). Apart from the concerns on 
immediate physical security, visibility versus invisibility is widely debated within the 
community in terms of potential long-term benefits for queer rights. Dagmara spoke about the 
split within the community on the issue of visibility. She said, one side believes that too much 
visibility, for example, the Pride Marches ‘with rainbows sticking everywhere’ damages the 
image of LGBTQ people, while the others think that it is important to show that they are normal 
people, but also are the part of the community.  
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Elena thinks, to be visible as a member of the community and advocate LGBTQ rights 
is very hard, because, in Poland, ‘the narrative is if you’re out and proud, they will find ways 
to tell you to go back in the closet’. She said, if you remain closeted, you may probably be 
safer, but ‘if you’re trying to, display affection to your same-sex partner, if you try to demand 
your equal rights, then yeah you are pervert, you deserve whatever is coming after you’.  
The respondents’ narratives indicate that many of them have been scared to present 
themselves as who they are (Basia, Ada, Kuba, Andrzej, Maja, Elena). Several respondents 
mentioned ‘Passing’– acting straight to avoid threats to physical safety. Some of them observed 
that LGBTQ individuals who ‘look’ ‘gay’ are more vulnerable to physical and verbal violence. 
‘I don’t look like a typical lesbian, so I don’t have problems like that. Because for Polish 
people, a gay woman looks different’– observed Ada. As a result, as their narratives show, 
LGBTQ individuals face the dilemma between visibility and invisibility. Keeping that in mind, 
here, resistance is understood as a broad concept that should also include various ‘hidden 
transcripts’ of security contestation.  
Data indicated that individual invisible choices of resistance directed against 
securitising actors should also be understood as resistance, together with active fight directed 
towards structural homophobia. Resistance from the ‘closet’ should not be understood as an 
act of submission, since the agency can be exercised and expressed from different sites, 
including from the closet – the private space, where physical security is guaranteed. Based on 
the data, strategies and forms of resistance can be categorised into three sites of 
resistance: public space, cyberspace and private space (the closet). Here, cyberspace functions 
interchangeably between public and private spaces, combining ‘connected sociality of public 
space with the anonymity of the closet’ (Woodland 2000:418). At the same time, public and 
private spaces are also closely connected: for example, although the Pride Marches are 
performed in the public space and thus are part of the public transcript, at the same time, for 
some, this can be seen as a hidden form of resistance – many queer individuals try to hide their 
faces and identity while attending the Pride Marches.  
Acknowledging that queer resistance is different from the heteronormative mode of 
security contestation, based on the data, the paper focuses on several forms of resistance and 
categorises them under three sites of contestation (Figure 4). These forms of resistance are not 
mutually exclusive and can be found in different configurations of practices of resistance in all 
three spaces. 
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Figure 4: Sites of contestation and forms of resistance based on the interview data. 
 
5.1 Too Queer to Fear: Resistance in Public Spaces 
Within the public space, resistance was categorised into collective and individual 
forms. To counter homophobia, raise awareness and tolerance by increasing visibility of 
LGBTQ issues is one of the main goals of resistance performed in the public spaces. If 
collective resistance takes more recourses and time, individual forms of resistance are available 
for many LGBTQ individuals. Besides, apart from the time and recourses, the LGBTQ 
community’s resistance tools are limited, considering their limited access to broader political 
and public discourses. By exploring resistance of Kraków’s LGBTQ community, this sub-
chapter analyses alternative ways of individual and collective resistance(s) found in the public 
space: something as small as wearing rainbow pins and other LGBTQ themed accessories to 
participating and organising Equality Pride Marches.  
According to Andrzej, in Poland, an essential obstacle to better-organised community 
resistance is a fear to be identified. Dagmara observed, refereeing to Stonewall Riots12 in order 
for LGBTQ movement to enter the mainstream, ‘it should just go to this very high-tension 
moment when the hell breaks loose, and then maybe there will be some change’. As Iwona 
notes, despite open homophobia ‘from so many sites in our own country’, many LGBTQ 
 
12 Stonewall riots (1969) were a series of demonstrations by members of LGBTQ community in response to a 
police raids in New York City, considered as one of the most important events in LGBTQ liberation movement 
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individuals face the dilemma between visibility and invisibility, that forces them back to the 
closet and limits possibilities of resistance. 
Organised resistance usually takes its culmination when two factors meet. First, when 
a watershed event happens, and second, as a result of oppression, minority groups unite based 
on shared identity, community and/or oppression (Szulc 2011). Arguably, two watershed 
events in contemporary Poland could trigger more organised resistance. First, declaration of 
LGBT-free zones by more than 80 municipalities in Poland, and second, brutal violence at the 
Equality Pride March in Bialystok. March in Bialystok received relatively wide media 
coverage and declaration of LGBT-free zones, undeniably shook not only Polish but 
international LGBTQ community, more precisely those, who got information about that. All 
respondents of this study mentioned declaration of LGBT-free zones and March in Bialystok 
as a somehow important moments for the Polish LGBTQ community triggering different forms 
of resistance. Even though it is too early to talk about the culmination of Polish LGBTQ 
resistance and it is beyond the scope of this thesis, in contemporary Polish LGBTQ resistance, 
both factors were present in 2019.  
 
5.1.1 ‘Your silence will not protect you’13: Equality Pride Marches and Collective 
Resistance(s) 
According to the narratives of the respondents, one of the most common forms of 
collective resistance is to join Equality Pride Marches and/or to organise under NGOs. Majority 
of the interviewees are members of student LGBTQ organisation Tęczuj and Kraków Equality 
Centre (Krakowskie Centrum Równości DOM EQ). Some of them are members of other 
LGBTQ NGOs, participate in various information campaigns and take part in organising 
Kraków Pride.  
Jan believes that grassroots activism, particularly organising under NGOs, is one of the 
best, if not the only mean to make their insecurities heard. On the question from whom they 
believed the LGBTQ community was receiving the most support, he said: 
 
I think, from each other. That’s the scary part, even though with all the things happening 
right, now my question is, where is European Union? Where is a firm, strong reaction 
 
13 ‘Your Silence Will Not Protect You’ is a quote by Audre Lorde and a title of her collection of essays, poems 
and speeches. 
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to what’s going on? It’s all politically correct; it’s all in the middle, it’s all kind of 
playing it’s safe. So, all we have is each other. 
 
Augusta believes that Polish LGBTQ community is pretty well organised. She says that 
they are used to the government targeting minorities in the past, so ‘we are pretty used to it, we 
can organise, come together and fight’. She recalled the case when ordinary citizens came 
together and wrote letters to sister cities in several EU member states from Polish towns which 
local governments declared as LGBT Free-zones. In response, some countries broke 
cooperation with those towns, condemning LGBTQ rights violations. Based on Augusta’s 
narrative, despite the fear, Polish LGBTQ community got used to their everyday condition of 
insecurity and continues to resist with all the means available: from individual to collective, 
from personal to community-based responses to the institutionalised homophobia.  
According to the respondents the Pride Marches in Poland are not only aimed to 
increase visibility and acceptance of LGBTQ individuals but to show that queer people are not 
a threat, are not a danger and that they are ordinary people. For Augusta, the Pride March is ‘a 
way to say. We are here, we are like you, we are people, look at us’; For Iwona, it is about 
showing that ‘we are not making any demands, we just want to be equal with the rest of 
society’.  
Iwona spoke about the increasing number of Equality Pride Marches held each year in 
Poland. She said if in the majority of countries this happens once or twice per year, there are 
around twenty-thirty Pride Marches in different cities of Poland. She underlined the aim and 
importance of these marches: 
 
Even if only a few hundred people were walking in that March, it still sends a message, 
I think, that we want to be seen and we want to be heard, and we want our rights to be 
respected. Because it’s not really about making demands, it is about these rights to be 
protected, to be able to be treated humanely.  
 
She also recalled when near the main square in Kraków, not far from the church where 
the archbishop of Kraków, who made homophobic comments was conducting a mass, people 
protested interestingly:  
 
People weren’t standing there with some kind of signs, but they were dancing. So, they 
were kind of, you know, showing that they are happy and they are free, and they’re 
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young and that they don’t care about what the archbishop said. But still showing him 
that it’s not okay, showing that we are stronger than that…that we will fight with that, 
we will not agree with that, but we will also still remain strong. 
 
The interview data indicate that attendance at the Pride marches is seen as one of the 
most common strategies of resistance. Pride in Poland has a radically different aim and purpose 
compared to a carnivalesque celebration with increasing consumerist tendencies observed, for 
example, in the United States, Australia, Canada and the Western Europe where sexual 
freedom, liberation and acceptance are celebrated (see Kates and Belk 2001). One can argue, 
that Marches in Poland have more in common with the early period of LGBTQ movement 
starting with Stonewall riots that changed the queer epistemology of closet into empowered 
political discourse. In Poland, at Prides defiance and visibility are performed, not liberation 
and acceptance.  
It is yet early to talk about concrete outcomes of the LGBTQ community’s resistance 
to (in)securitisation. However, Poland’s presidential elections held in July 2020 shows, that 
socially conservative and openly homophobic president Andrzej Duda did not enjoy as much 
support as the PiS party expected (BBC News 2020; pinknews 2020). Duda won 51.2%, the 
slimmest presidential victory in independent Poland’s history since 1989. Amid various 
controversial policies, homophobic rhetoric has been central in his presidential campaign 
(Maurice 2020, Easton 2020). Even though it is hard to measure the role of LGBTQ resistance 
in this historically narrow margin victory, it can be argued, increasing visibility and awareness 
of LGBTQ issues could have played a role.  
 
5.1.2 Pins and Bricolage 
Rainbow-coloured flags, bracelets, T-shirts with slogans are considered to be symbols 
of LGBTQ movement (Kates and Belk 2001). Usage of accessories by subculture groups as a 
form of consumer resistance has been explored by numerous authors (Hebdige 1979; 
MacAloon 1984; Fiske 1989; Murray and Ozanne 1991; Willis 2014). The usage of LGBTQ 
themed accessories at the Pride Marches may be interpreted as a collective form of resistance 
(Kates and Belk 2001).  
Exploration of the meaning of LGBTQ themed accessorising as an everyday choice of 
resistance, brings into focus the queer security dilemma: choice between visibility versus 
invisibility. Several respondents (Dagmara, Andrzej, Elena, Jan) mentioned that it is more 
likely to be physically or verbally abused if you are wearing or carrying LGBTQ related 
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accessories and/or clothes. Dagmara notes, ‘in general, it’s just not very safe to have too many 
rainbow or LGBT related accessories.’ She says, for a long time, she was avoiding being visible 
as a queer person, because she was scared. But now, she wears pins and bracelets to show that 
she is not afraid. However, she thinks it would be still scary to wear something ‘very, very 
visible’. Dagmara said, she is feeling anxious when wearing a rainbow pin on her backpack. 
She recalled that one girl was beaten in the street for carrying rainbow bag near the National 
Museum in Kraków, during a daytime. She also remembered how she got verbally abused in 
the streets for wearing a Stonewall T-shirt, ‘there would be less of that if there were actual laws 
against the hate speech’– she added. 
For Iwona, LGBTQ themed accessorising is associated with a victory over 
homophobia. She recalled a court case against a person who had a flag of Polish herb with a 
rainbow background at one of the Pride Marches. She proudly mentioned, because of the 
LGBTQ community’s mobilisation and support, the judge declared that it did not violate the 
national symbols and that that it should be seen as an arty expression. She believed that events 
like that could set a precedent for LGBTQ individuals’ future fight for their rights.  
Accessorising as a form of resistance against (in)securitisiation is another interesting 
aspect that is usually absent in masculinised security studies. Even though it may not be 
explicitly directed against securitisation, in the climate of (in)security, all deviant choices and 
signs of queer solidarity should be understood as resistance against dominant (in)securitising 
paradigms not captured by queer-blind mainstream security discourse.  
 
5.2 Cyber Space and ‘Platformisation’ of LGBTQ Community: 
Virals as ‘Hidden Transcripts’ of Resistance 
Another aspect that emerged from the data is increasing platformisation of LGBTQ 
resistance in Poland. This happens in two directions: first, increasing use of digital platforms 
as the sites of resistance. Second, as a result of protest to the National Media, LGBTQ 
individuals’ increasing use of digital media in getting and sharing information. According to 
the data, the absolute majority of the respondents engage in at least one form of resistance 
within the cyberspace. Posting, tweeting, sharing LGBTQ related news and opinions also 
comprise a form of resistance. These micro strategies of resistance are aimed at resisting 
dominant ‘regime of truth’ advertised in media and rooted in homophobia.  
Elena underlined that they do not have official platforms to make their voices heard; 
that is why the internet plays a crucial role. For them, getting visibility is very difficult because 
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there is not much space for LGBTQ issues in Polish mainstream media discourse. While some 
LGBTQ individuals refuse to watch National Media, others engage in a different strategy of 
resistance – by writing for LGBTQ online platforms such as queer.pl and by creating various 
Facebook groups where they share and spread information. Social networks are used not only 
for getting information but also for launching various LGBTQ visibility campaigns. In these 
campaigns, images, memes and so-called virals play an important role in contesting and 
challenging dominant paradigms, including the Government, the Church and the National 
Media that openly (in) securitise LGBTQ individuals as threats to Polish national identity and 
values.  
The Subjective perception and understanding of resistance largely influence 
individuals’ resistance strategies. Augusta, an online activist, believes, for her, resistance is ‘a 
way of being activist, go against this hateful rhetoric’ by informing the international 
community. She said that after brutality on the Białystok March, she went on twitter and started 
writing. Now she has several hundred followers and believes, she is doing her small part. She 
said, her good command of English enables her to reach the international LGBTQ community 
better and hopes to be heard by the European Union.  
Data showed that memes, images and so-called ‘virals’ play an important role in Polish 
LGBTQ resistance to securitising actors’ (in)securitising attempts. Several respondents 
(Augusta, Jakub, Filip, Maja, Adam, Andrzej) mentioned that visual messaging with LGBTQ 
symbols are commonly used by the queer community. Jakub and Iwona recalled the case about 
sixteen years old Polish teenager form city of Jordanów, who was reported to the police by the 
city mayor Andrzej Malczewski after he posted an image of the city’s coat of arms with 
rainbow colours on a social network. By that, sixteen years old Janek was protesting the 
declaration of LGBT-free zones by the local government (Gazeta Krakówska 2020). Jordanów 
‘adopted’ ‘LGBT-free’ resolution in May 2019, and sixteen years old teenager was forced to 
make an official apology for ‘improper behaviour’ (Kośmiński 2020). In solidarity with Janek, 
the campaign went viral with hashtag JestemzJankiem (I am with Janek) and dozens of coats 
of arms in rainbow colours appeared on Twitter.14 The initiative was supported and shared by 
LGBTQ supporters, activists, celebrities and politicians from the opposition parties. 
Cyberspace not only enables LGBTQ individuals to communicate and lobby more 
effectively but also allows them to get unbiased information. All fifteen respondents observed 
 
14 See on Twitter https://twitter.com/search?q=jestemzjankiem&src=typeahead_click, consulted on 6 July 
2020 
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that Polish National Media is very biased against LGBTQ community and many of them 
explicitly underlined that they do not watch TV because it serves as a tool of propaganda in the 
hands of the ruling PiS party. As one respondent observed: – ‘national media is not national 
anymore, it’s is kind of government media where is no place for plurality’ (Elena). As a way 
of protest, they refuse to watch National TV channels. ‘I am super against the public television, 
all of my family, we don’t watch, and we don’t pay taxes for it’– observed Piotr. The protest 
to National Media for some respondents is translated into a protest to all TV channels, most of 
which, either completely ignore LGBTQ issues, or use inappropriate language and lack 
awareness of their problems (Jakub). As a result, digital platforms have become the primary 
sources of information.  
To sum up, the cyberspace functions as a place where many LGBTQ individuals may 
feel what Anne-Marie Fortier calls ‘ontological security’– a sense of belonging at the 
welcoming place, continuity and confidence (2002: 190). A place where a feeling of security 
is mediated with ‘complicated games of anonymity and intimacy, privacy and disclosure’ 
(Kunstman 2004). At the same time, it serves as a site of resistance where various LGBTQ 
initiatives and visibility campaigns are launched both at national and international level 
(Gruszczynska 2007). With growing digitalisation of everyday lives, queer resistance is also 
getting digitalised. Therefore, it is particularly important to address the cyberspace as an 
alternative site of resistance where marginalised queer voices resist and counter securitisation 
and structural violence, perpetrated by securitising actors who are dominantly present in the 
mainstream media discourses.  
 
5.3. Resistance(s) from the Private Spaces 
5.3.1 Resistance from the Closet: Rejection of the Nationalist Symbols and 
Construction of ‘Gay Polish Patriot’  
Keeping in mind the importance of ontological security for queer individuals invisible 
and  private strategies of resistance performed form the closet should also be taken into account. 
Since hegemonic nationalist discourse lives no space for LGBTQ individuals, to mediate this 
feeling of alienation from the nation, some of them constructed their understanding of being a 
proud Pole and a patriot:  
 
I am a patriot, meaning that I am a person who pays taxes, uses public transport and 
pays for it, who takes care of the environment… I am proud Polish, and I do not want 
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to change it. I am just sad that when I see the Polish flag, it reminds me of (far-right) 
Nationalism. And I wish to have a T-shirt with the Polish flag, but when I see the person 
like that on the street, I’m already scared, and I move the distance (Piotr). 
 
For Piotr to be a ‘patriot in a good way’ means to be ‘a person who is a proud Polish, 
with an open mind, who is not afraid of LGBTQ people or refugees […] It is about being a 
good person and add an extra part that you are proud of your country’. According to him in the 
current political context patriotism is associated with radical-right, that is why he refuses to 
embrace nationalist symbols like the Polish flag and National Independence Day celebrated on 
11th of November.  
Elena, who is a member of Krakofonia, one of Poland’s two LGBTQ choirs, also talked 
about the dissonance between her Polish identity and her sexual and gender identities. She 
thinks that many LGBTQ people are not comfortable with Polish national symbols because 
they associate it with homophobia and extremism. She recalled the case when several members 
of her choir opposed celebration of Polish Independence Day, thinking that ‘if this country 
rejects them as a person, why would they want to celebrate it?’. The choir was also polarised 
when someone suggested singing the Polish National Anthem. She said some of the members 
of the choir defended the idea by saying, ‘we are Polish, this is our country, this is our anthem, 
we have every right to be singing it!’. Elena also expressed her take on the issue: 
 
We are citizens, fellow countrymen. We speak the same language, we attended the same 
school. We share the same culture, the same history, it’s our country as well as yours, 
we have a right to the anthem, we should sing it.  
 
Piotr’s and Elena’s narratives illustrate how LGBTQ people lose their feeling of 
belonging to the nation as a result of far-right homophobic discourses’ monopolisation of 
national symbols, nationalf identity and ideas of patriotism. Elena’s quote well summarises the 
consequence of the current government’s institutionalised homophobia on LGBTQ 
individuals’ sense of belonging to the nation in a broader timeframe: 
 
People had problems with the governments, but not with a nation and not, you know, 
not with an identity. They were Polish people who felt second-class citizens, and they 
fought for the equal price, but they didn’t feel rejected, they just feel felt dismissed. The 
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recent events, the recent years, make me feel like I don’t belong in this country, in this 
nation anymore, and I think, that’s the saddest part. 
 
Both strategies of resistance to the PiS nationalist discourse: resistance by constructing 
a different understanding of patriotism and refusal to embrace nationalist symbols should be 
understood as resistance – individual defiant choices directed against the dominant securitising 
paradigm of the key securitising actor – the Polish government.  
  
5.3.2 Privatisation of Religion: Resisting the Church – ‘Christian, but not 
Catholic in this Government’s way’ 
Majority of the respondents were born and raised in Catholic families. Even though in 
Poland religion plays an important role in many Polish families, experiences of Polish Christian 
LGBTQ individuals are overlooked and understudied (Mikulak 2019), following the flawed 
logic of considering being queer and being religious as mutually exclusive. Assertions like that 
exclude the experiences of Christian LGBTQ individuals, who may suffer from lack of 
acceptance from both the Church as an institution and the LGBTQ community. 
The absolute majority of the respondents (fourteen out of fifteen) said they were born 
and raised in Catholic families. Several respondents identified themselves as Christians 
(Andrzej, Kuba, Piotr, Ada), but, as Ada observed, ‘not Catholic in this government’s way’. 
Piotr also underlined that he considers himself as Christian but does not trust the Church as a 
religious institution. However, Dagmara thinks, it is impossible to be Catholic and queer at the 
same time. ‘I don’t know anyone who is gay and stayed in the Catholic Church’– she observed. 
‘For me, it’s the organisation for now, and I’m close to signing out’, noted Piotr. 
Filip, a transgender man, also talked about the role of religion in his life while accepting 
and realising his sexual and gender identity. Even though he was religious as a child, with time, 
he started to lose faith because he was ‘starting to feel different’. ‘So, more and more I started 
to see that the Church is not for me, not because the of the religion itself or the philosophy of 
the religion, but because of the institution that church is’ – said Filip. Several other respondents 
(Andrzej, Piotr, Kuba, Elena) also talked about the change of their attitudes with the realisation 
of their gender and sexual identities. Based on the interview data, protest to the Church 
sometimes is translated into the production of alternative configurations of Christian LGBTQ 
identity. 
The literature focusing on queer individuals’ choices to exit from the public sphere of 
religion, by separating belief and practice is extremely limited, only a few authors addressing 
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the issue (Stychin 2009; Gill and Waite 2012; Nynäs 2016). Because religion is an integral part 
of Polish national identity, LGBTQ individuals try to construct their own understanding of 
Christianity. This turn can be explained with the growing trend of privatisation of religion by 
queer individuals. Stephen Hart (1987) discussed several phenomena that can be indicative of 
what he called ‘privatisation’ of religion. The first is ‘religion without Churches’ – ‘people 
experiencing worship, enjoying a vital spiritual life, and sometimes even supporting religious 
causes, without the benefit of normal churches and without having to deal directly with other 
people’ (1987: 320).  
According to Ada in contemporary Poland, to be a Christian and to be a Catholic is 
different, because she believes, Christianity means to be a tolerant and a good person, while to 
be Catholic ‘it is like institutional’. She does not go to the Church, but she goes to meetings 
organised by Christian LGBT organisation Faith and Rainbow (Wiara i Tęcza). This Christian 
LGBTQ organisation operates in public space, but it also offers LGBTQ individuals a private 
space for religious discussions. Some LGBTQ people, including Ada, go to their meetings not 
in a hope to seek acceptance from the Church, but only to talk about religion and their faith: – 
‘I am going to the meetings of Faith and Rainbow because I am also a Christian person. I 
believe in God, but I don’t go to the Church’– noted Ada.  
To sum up, as a result of the Church’s open homophobia and portrayal of LGBTQ 
people as threats, the Church stops to be a place where LGBTQ individuals feel secure. Thus, 
refuse to accept the Church as a place of worship. Privatisation of religion by the Christian 
LGBTQ individuals can be understood as another form of resistance to the Polish Roman 
Catholic Church. The presented study opens a gap to study privatisation of religion in Poland, 
where the Church plays an important role not only in the narratives on national identity but 
also in everyday experiences of (in)security of LGBTQ individuals. 
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
The chapter provided an empirical picture of resistance derived from the interview data. 
It presented three sites of resistance: public, cyber and private spaces where LGBTQ 
individuals seek to counter homophobia and make their (in)securities heard. By doing so, they 
use various configurations of collective and individual, visible and invisible resistance(s). Data 
shows that visibility is precisely one of the critical goals of LGBTQ activists in Poland. 
However, marginal LGBTQ voices face severe constraints in access to public and political 
discourse, that is why their fight for visibility is even more difficult. For that reason, it is 
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particularly important to focus on various invisible and visible forms of resistance by directly 
engaging with LGBTQ individuals, taking a bottom-up approach to understanding their 
insecurities and their fight for security. It is also essential to make better use of various online 
platforms and visual messaging, widely employed by marginal groups as tools of resistance. 
Considering those important implications, the chapter showed, that it is crucial to overcome 
the flawed logic of security as a discursive construction, both practise and experience 
privileging heteronormativity, authority and privilege. Because epistemological reliance only 
on the public articulation of (in)security excludes resistance of marginalised populations who 
often face visibility/invisibility dilemma. That is why the thesis calls for a genuine bottom-up 
approach directly engaging with the subjects of (in)securitisation and giving them a voice to 
articulate security problems and their understanding of resistance. Only then it would be 
possible to identify and acknowledge queer voices outside the mainstream discourses. 
Public, cyber and private spaces are the sites of resistance where insecurity and 
homophobia are contested. With various degrees of success, resistance is a non-discursive field 
of contestation between words, images and practices employed and used by the silenced 
subjects of security to be heard and their security to be acknowledged. Resistance as a bottom-
up approach provides the most contextual understanding of how insecurity is articulated, and 















This study sought to contribute to the knowledge bases of studies of security and 
resistance. By queering the central concepts – security and resistance, the thesis problematised 
heteronormative conceptions of the key concepts in this study and answered two key research 
questions. First, it managed to capture the security problems of LGBTQ individuals not 
experienced by heteronormative cisgender citizens. Thus, underlined importance of queering 
security in order to capture security problems absent from dominant security paradigms, 
especially under exclusionary far-right politics, when the government’s exclusionary politics 
(in) securitise the marginal populations. Second, by queering resistance, it became possible to 
see queer agency and sites of queer resistance, that challenges existing security literature which 
tends to portray LGBTQ people as disempowered objects and victims. By that thesis 
emphasised on the emancipatory potential of resistance that can give LGBTQ individuals a 
voice in shaping security agenda. As a result, thesis contributed to a better understanding of 
the security dynamics surrounding the (in)securitisation of homosexuality in Poland, because 
it showed that securitisation is not only a top-down process by which the LGBTQ community 
is (in)securitised, but it also enabled to note the queer voices and resistance(s) against this 
move. By considering and showing the agency and resistance of the queer community and by 
acknowledging possibilities of success of resistance, the study opened up the potential for 
including their voices in inclusive queer-informed security framework, that can shield marginal 
communities from oppressive politics and empower them to ‘speak’ security in a modern 
political project in Poland. 
Based on the interview data and crosschecking from secondary sources, the study 
found, in Poland, LGBTQ individuals experience identity-based discrimination: 
• violations of human rights and political repression 
• physical and verbal violence 
• discrimination at the workplace 
• lack of legal protections and barriers to access to healthcare 
Thus, their political, personal, economic and health security is undermined. The study 
also explored the narratives of the key securitising actors as perceived by the subjects of this 
study. According to the interviewees, the ruling Law and Justice Party, Polish Roman Catholic 
Church and the National Media are the primary sources of their (in)securitisation. Together 
with mapping LGBTQ (in)security, the thesis explored various non-discursive strategies of 
(in)security contestation including practice (NGO membership, Equality Pride Marches), 
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visuals (images, memes, virals) and resistance(s) from the closet: the rejection of nationalist 
symbolism and privatisation of religion. Focus on these forms of resistance are usually left out 
from masculinised approaches to security contestation. Therefore, to include LGBTQ voices 
in security agenda and make their voices heard it is crucial to put forward non-heteronormative 
conception of resistance, taking into account marginal populations’ lack of access to public and 
political discourses. 
The substantive research gap that motivated this study was the lack of queer approaches 
in security studies, especially the absence of studies on threats and everyday security problems 
experienced by LGBTQ communities, especially in the context of the current rise of 
exclusionary far-right politics across Europe. It was mainly motivated by increasing anti-
LGBTQ sentiments in several European democracies and lack of empirical studies on queer 
security under peacetime in developed countries. The thesis employed queer epistemological 
standpoint and engaged with poststructuralist feminist critique (Hansen 2000) and PARIS 
school’s problematisation of (in)security informed by International Political Sociology (Bigo, 
Huysmans). The study emphasised that even though both approaches problematise the lack of 
voice and pay particular attention to vulnerable groups, they speak about these people, but not 
with them, generally rendering them ‘silent’ and invisible. The thesis problematised this 
complete silence and introduced resistance as a tool of agency of marginal groups in security 
discourse. The concept of resistance was used as a conceptual and analytical frame to get a 
better insight into queer (in)security and resistance. In addition, the most importantly, the study 
analysed each concept and framework through a queer lens.  
Thus, theoretically, the thesis pointed to the importance of reflecting on the role of 
agency in the security agenda. It also showed that LGBTQ people resistance strategies to 
(in)securitisation should be studied outside the heteronormative framework taking into account 
the security dilemma that LGBTQ individuals face in access to public discourses. The 
epistemological shift to visibility/invisibility problematised what it means to ‘speak up’ in 
resistance to (in)securitisation. Expansion of the focus to visuals and more hidden ways of 
contestation was dictated by acknowledging ‘queer security dilemma’ which is about the 
irreconcilable paradox between conditional security that comes with invisibility and the desire 
to be heard. Considering the importance of ‘queer security dilemma’, the study challenged the 
flawed logic of security as both to practise and experience privileging heteronormativity, 
authority and power, because epistemological reliance only on the public articulation of 
(in)security excludes resistance strategies of marginalised populations who often face 
visibility/invisibility dilemma. The thesis argued that in order to include queer voices in 
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inclusive conception of security, the focus should be directed towards the LGBTQ 
community’s resistance found in various ways of security contestation outside the mainstream 
discourses.  
Besides the theoretical implication, the study documents the practice of LGBTQ 
individuals and activists who are directly involved in contesting (in)securitisation perpetrated 
by the Law and Justice ruling party, Polish Roman Catholic Church and the Polish National 
Media. Discussion of the empirical data generated through fieldwork interviews provided deep 
insight into the complex dynamics of queer (in)security and resistance in Poland. It is a hope 
that the evidence and analysis of this thesis will be helpful for future LGBTQ activism and 
broadening of the scope of security analysis in contemporary Poland.  
Finally, many of the stories analysed in this paper are not a part of history. As this thesis 
is being written, the LGBTQ community’s struggle for their rights, safety and security 
continues. Recent presidential elections, won by right-wing openly homophobic Andrzej Duda 
(BBC.com 2020) may indicate that Polish LGBTQ community’s (in)securitisation will 
continue. It is still uncertain how the Polish LGBTQ community’s security issues will be 
addressed under socially and politically conservative ruling party supported by the current 
openly homophobic president. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to direct attention to 
everyday insecurities and struggle of LGBTQ community against dominant paradigm, focusing 
on resistance(s) not easily found and observed in official public and political discourses.  
 
6.1. Why and How Focus on Resistance as a Tool of Agency can 
Benefit Queered Approach to Security? 
The study showed that focus on resistance as an expression of agency could benefit 
queered approach to security because it allows to hear and note marginal voices that are ignored 
by mainstream security discourse. Consequently, the acknowledgement of queer voices, 
empowers them to have a say in shaping inclusive security agenda, that would shield them 
from oppression. Employing resistance as a form of security articulation and contestation 
overcomes dichotomic understanding of LGBTQ people as ‘threats’ and ‘vulnerable’ subjects 
– disempowered victims with no agency. Focusing on resistance as a bottom-up flow of 
security contestation and (in)security articulation may have important methodological 
implications. Direct engagement with the voices marginalised by mainstream politics and 
discourses, not only provides the most accurate, people-based understanding of security but 
also empowers LGBTQ individuals to make their voices heard. 
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At the same time, making these marginal voices visible would only be possible by 
queering the concept of resistance, acknowledging queer security dilemma associated with the 
danger of visibility. Queering resistance would mean to understand it as a broad practice of 
various forms of resistance(s) to the precarious condition of (in)security. While 
demonstrations, Equality Pride Marches and visibility campaigns play an important role in 
increasing queer visibility, one should keep in mind the existence of queer security dilemma 
and acknowledge, that not all LGBTQ individuals have a privilege to be seen. That is why it is 
particularly important to direct attention to different forms of resistance performed in public, 
cyber and private spaces, that includes different collective and individual resisting practises. 
Consideration of Cyberspace as an important site of security contestation in queer resistance 
unveils different practices of resistance where support to queer community can be channelled. 
Resistance from the closet can only be captured by directly engaging with the community. That 
is why the thesis calls for genuine bottom-up approach directly engaging with the subjects of 
(in)securitisation and giving them a voice to articulate (in)securities and their understanding of 
resistance. 
Besides, acknowledging marginalised voices contesting the Polish government’s, the 
Church’s and the National Media’s attempt to present the LGBTQ community as a threat may 
bring about the possibility of progressive change in how LGBTQ security is conceived. 
Therefore, identifying and empowering these marginal voices is that of the key importance to 
ensure not only everyday security of the queer community but also to bring about more 
normative understanding into the concept of security. That is why it is particularly important 
to understand how marginal and vulnerable people can be affected by actors who claim 
authority over deciding whose security matters. To empower and support these communities, 
it is even more important to understand better the tools of the agency that they may employ to 
make their voices heard. Using security framework to address these problems can be useful for 
considering LGBTQ security issues as urgent and politicised, ensuring timely and appropriate 
response of the governments’ more pro-human rights forces and other stakeholders, including 
international organisations and human rights advocacy groups. While measuring immediate 
progress and success of queer community’s resistance may be hard, acknowledging their voices 
is essential. Since security is an inter-subjective construction, having more voices included in 
the security project is crucial for a move towards an alternative conception of security that 
would include security for all, not just for some.  
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6.2 Limitations and Further Research 
The empirical work took the case study of Poland and was based on fieldwork material 
gathered from interviews with LGBTQ individuals and activists based in Kraków. Even though 
the fieldwork was conducted only in Kraków, the respondents come from different regions of 
Poland, bringing different/various perspectives and experiences that make the study more 
representative. Observations and interpretations of the data are important and meaningful in 
addressing LGBTQ community’s problems, however, cannot be generalised to all 
(in)securitising and resistance practices in different contexts. More generalisable findings 
would have required a much more extended period of fieldwork in different Polish cities, towns 
and villages.  
Another possible limitation comes from the subjectivity of the author of this thesis, who 
tried to be a voice of the subjects of this study. The very epistemological standpoint that the 
study took made the critical distance from the interviewees’ narratives extremely difficult. 
Even though it was a conscious decision to empathise with the subjects of this study, while 
interpreting and analysing the data the codes were generated with a maximum effort to avoid 
any biases.  
Another limitation of this study comes from its inability to capture different forms of 
security contestation, including desecuritisation and emancipation and how they relate to the 
concept of resistance in a queered approach. Exploration of various dynamic of (in)security 
contestation and how they related to queered security analysis can be a topic for future studies.  
The thesis also reveals gaps in the literature on queer security and queer resistance. It 
opens two broad theoretical and empirical gaps. First, how (in)security is experienced by 
marginal groups under far-right homophobic governments and second, how (in)security is 
resisted under active (in)securitisation. Regarding empirical research gaps, there are virtually 
no studies on queer (in)security and resistance using security framework taking cases of 
European democracies with homophobic governments.  
As mentioned previously, in several European democracies, the LGBTQ community 
continues to be marginalised. The rise of exclusionary far-right populism across Europe not 
only makes sexual minorities face significant constraints to their freedom of expression but 
also endangers them. Serious human rights violations of LGBTQ people are observed in several 
Eastern European countries: Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Czechia, Slovakia and 
Hungary (IGLA Europe 2020). Therefore, it is crucial to expand the empirical analysis to 
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different cases, that would also contribute to the development of a solid theoretical foundation 
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Appendix A. List of Interviewees 
 
Code Pseudonym Preferred Gender 
Pronoun 
Description Place  
1 Ada She LGBTQ 
Individual/Member at 
Faith and Rainbow 
Kraków 
2 Augusta She/They Online Activist Kraków 
3 Jakub He/They Vice President of 
LGBTQ Organisation  
Kraków 
4 Iwona She/They Vice President of 
LGBTQ Organisation 
Kraków 




6 Filip He/They Member of LGBTQ 
organisation 
Kraków 
7 Basia She Member of LGBTQ 
Organisation 
Kraków 
8 Alix They LGBTQ Individual Kraków 
9 Jan He YouTuber, Activist Kraków 
10 Kuba He/They Member of LGBTQ 
Organisation 
Kraków 
11 Adam They Member of LGBTQ 
Organisation 
Kraków 
12 Piotr He LGBTQ Individual Kraków 




14 Andrzej He Member of LGBTQ 
organisation 
Kraków 











 Appendix B: Plain Language Statement 
 
Title: Security as Silence.  Securitisation of LGBTQ community in Poland 
Researcher: Eva Modebadze 
Email: 2407542M@student.gla.ac.uk 
Supervisors: Dr Ammon Cheskin (Ammon.cheskin@glasgow.ac.uk) 
                     Dr Maciej Stepka (maciek.stepka@uj.edu.pl) 
'You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
Thank you for reading this'.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study aims to study how LGBTQ community in Poland is trying to make their problems heard to 
the wider public and the government. The study focuses on threats perceived and problems faced by 
LGBTQ community in Poland. Purpose here is to provide evidence and recommendations that can be 
used by LGBT advocacy groups, NGOs and other interested actors in the dialogue with the 
stakeholders including more liberal minded forces in Polish government. The study will last from 
01.02.2020 till 06.06.2020. 
• You have been chosen because your opinion will help the research better understand problems 
faced by LGBTQ community in Poland. Overall 20 representatives of LGBTQ community and 
activists will be interviewed.  
• Taking part in this research is purely voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving any reason 
• The interview will last approximately 45-50 minutes. If you will agree, interview will be audio 
recorded.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Confidentiality will be ensured by removing all identifiers and replacing the data with codes. Your 
name will be replaced by a pseudonym, unless you explicitly ask to be named. Please note that 
assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered to unless evidence of wrongdoing or potential 
harm is uncovered. In such cases the University may be obliged to contact relevant statutory 
bodies/agencies. 
• The data will be destroyed after research. The information collected will be used for dissertation, 
journal articles and conference papers. Upon request, researcher will provide you with the online 
publication or print copy. 
• The project has been reviewed by the School of Education Ethics Forum at the University of 
Glasgow. 
• If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of this research project, you can contact the 






Appendix C: Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Project:    Security as Silence.  Securitisation of LGBTQ community in Poland 
Name of Researcher:   Eva Modebadze 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language Statement/Participant Information Sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 




   No   Yes 
I agree to take part in this research study 
  
  
I consent to interviews being audio-recorded    
             
  
I give consent that apart from researcher mentioned above, her supervisors and 
examiners will also have access to the interview recordings   





I ask to be referred to by pseudonym only                            
 
  
I give consent be identified by name in any publications arising from the research   
                                                       
  
I give consent my direct quotes to be used  
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